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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
MAY 30 2003  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
BY [Signature] DEPUTY

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
EASTERN DIVISION

JANET I. FISCHER, )  
 )  
Plaintiff, ) EDCV 02-691-OMP (SGLx)  
 )  
v. )  
 )  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
JOHN ASHCROFT, in his official )  
and individual capacity, et al., )  
 )  
Defendants. )

OPINION

ENTERED  
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
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PANNER, J.

Pro se plaintiff Janet I. Fischer brings this civil rights and racketeering action against almost 100 defendants, including state and federal judges, prosecutors, court administrative personnel, and private attorneys in California, Texas, Oklahoma, and Florida. In a 91-page first amended complaint, with 55 pages of attachments, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to prevent persons who had been prosecuted for animal welfare violations from proceeding with subsequent civil lawsuits.

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1 Defendants move to dismiss. I grant the motions and dismiss  
2 this action in part for lack of personal and subject-matter  
3 jurisdiction and with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

4 **BACKGROUND**

5 Plaintiff alleges that from 1968 to 1992, she was "engaged  
6 in product development," breeding exotic animals. See First Am.  
7 Compl. at 34; Exh. A, at 6. Plaintiff alleges that in the early  
8 1990s, raids "by local government and private vigilantes resulted  
9 in theft of pedigreed exotic fowl valued at over \$100,000.00."  
10 Exh. A, at 6. Plaintiff brought an action in state court against  
11 state officials and others she blamed for the raids, but that  
12 action was apparently dismissed at least six years ago. Id. at  
13 7.

14 Plaintiff alleges defendants initiated "[b]aseless  
15 complaints and false charges" against "older American citizens  
16 who owned property." First Am. Compl. at 29. "The perpetrators  
17 committed criminal trespass and theft to extort fees and fines  
18 from their 'targets/victims' on the pretext that the victim  
19 violated some city or county codes, while factually there was no  
20 jurisdiction, no crime, no indictment, and no verified  
21 complaint." Id. Defendants used the courts to impose "phony"  
22 fines, costs, and sanctions. When defendants' victims responded  
23 by bringing legal actions against defendants, even the lawyers  
24 representing the victims joined defendants' conspiracy,  
25 "suckering" the victims "into more fees and costs with honeyed  
26 words about how 'you have a good case for an appeal . . . .'"

1 Id. at 30. Meanwhile, court clerks collected filing fees from  
2 defendants' victims although they knew that other defendants "had  
3 the courts rigged and would dismiss the case with prejudice, not  
4 for publication, no hearings, no trial by jury so as not to have  
5 any of these fraud and swindle schemes exposed to the public."

6 Id. at 30-31.

7 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well  
8 as civil penalties, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees.  
9 She also seeks "[a] damn good explanation for all this from each  
10 defendant." First Am. Compl. at 91 (original emphasis).

#### 11 **DISCUSSION**

12 The court should construe the pleadings of a pro se litigant  
13 more leniently than those drafted by a lawyer. See Eldridge v.  
14 Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). Pro se litigants are  
15 not, however, entitled to the benefit of every conceivable doubt.  
16 The court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual inferences  
17 in the plaintiff's favor. McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504  
18 (9th Cir. 1974). The court is not required to toss out common  
19 sense when it interprets a pro se litigant's pleadings. Id.

20 In the following discussion, I address different grounds for  
21 dismissal. Many defendants are entitled to dismissal on several  
22 grounds, such as out-of-state judges who are entitled to  
23 dismissal for failure to establish personal jurisdiction and  
24 absolute immunity.

#### 25 **I. Standing**

26 Plaintiff's complaint appears to assert claims based on

1 alleged acts directed at other persons who have no apparent  
2 connection to plaintiff other than being alleged victims of  
3 defendants. To establish that she has standing to maintain a  
4 civil action under RICO, plaintiff must show that she was injured  
5 in her business or property because of a violation of the  
6 statute's substantive provisions. Oregon Laborers-Employers  
7 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957,  
8 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). "[T]he alleged  
9 violation of the law [must] be a 'proximate cause' of the injury  
10 suffered." Id. (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection  
11 Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). "A direct relationship between  
12 the injury and the alleged wrongdoing, although not the 'sole  
13 requirement' of RICO . . . proximate causation, 'has been one of  
14 its central elements.'" Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).  
15 "Civil rights violations and injury to reputation do not fall  
16 within the statutory definition of 'racketeering activity.'" Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997).

18 Here, plaintiff's complaint alleges that persons in other  
19 states, with no alleged business relationship or any other  
20 connection to plaintiff, were the victims of defendants' alleged  
21 RICO enterprise. A plaintiff who complains "of harm flowing  
22 merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the  
23 defendant's acts" generally is too far removed to recover  
24 damages. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69.

25 Because plaintiff is not a lawyer, she cannot represent  
26 anyone other than herself. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United

1 States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987). I conclude that  
2 plaintiff lacks standing to bring RICO claims as to alleged  
3 misconduct concerning third parties to this action.

4 Similarly, plaintiff lacks standing to bring civil rights  
5 claims on behalf of third parties. Plaintiffs generally cannot  
6 base a claim on the legal rights or interests of third parties.  
7 Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995). There is an  
8 exception if the plaintiff can show that (1) the plaintiff has a  
9 concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute; (2) the  
10 plaintiff has a close relationship with the third party; and (3)  
11 there is a hindrance to third party's ability to protect her  
12 interests. Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix,  
13 Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not shown  
14 that she falls within this exception. She has no standing to  
15 bring civil rights claims based on third-party victims of  
16 defendants' alleged conspiracy.

17 Plaintiff also has failed to establish taxpayer standing.  
18 "Taxpayer status alone ordinarily does not confer Article III  
19 standing to challenge general exercises of governmental power."  
20 Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir.) (citing  
21 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation  
22 of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982)), cert.  
23 denied, 123 S. Ct. 113 (2002).

24 Because plaintiff lacks standing as to her claims regarding  
25 defendants' alleged third-party victims, all of those claims must  
26 be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

1 jurisdiction.

2 **II. No Personal Jurisdiction over Out-of-State Defendants**

3 Plaintiff names as defendants judges, court officials,  
4 prosecutors, and private attorneys in Texas, Florida, and  
5 Oklahoma. Most of the out-of-state defendants have moved to  
6 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because they have no  
7 contacts with California. Plaintiff has not alleged that the  
8 out-of-state defendants have ties to California other than  
9 conclusory statements that these defendants conspired with the  
10 California defendants.

11 "California's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the  
12 limits imposed by the Due Process Clause." Gordy v. Daily News,  
13 L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc.  
14 Code § 410.10). To determine whether personal jurisdiction is  
15 proper for a non-resident defendant based on the "minimum  
16 contacts" necessary to satisfy due process, the court should  
17 consider three requirements: (1) the non-resident defendant must  
18 act to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing  
19 business in the forum state, invoking the protections of the  
20 forum state's laws; (2) the claim must arise or result from the  
21 forum-related conduct; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must  
22 be reasonable. Id. at 831-32.

23 Here, plaintiff's conclusory and unfounded allegations of a  
24 conspiracy between defendants in California and out-of-state  
25 defendants cannot establish the minimum contacts necessary to  
26 show personal jurisdiction. It would violate due process to

1 assert personal jurisdiction over these out-of-state defendants  
2 based solely on plaintiff's bare allegations of a nation-wide  
3 conspiracy. I dismiss the non-California defendants for lack of  
4 personal jurisdiction.

## 5 **II. Absolute Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity**

6 Many of the named defendants are judges, court personnel,  
7 and prosecutors, both state and federal.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff alleges that  
8 prosecutors brought baseless criminal actions for violations of  
9 animal welfare laws and failed to prosecute officials for civil  
10 rights violations, while judges and court employees improperly  
11 dismissed legal actions brought by alleged victims of defendants'  
12 conspiracy.

### 13 **A. Judicial Defendants**

14 Judges are absolutely immune from actions for damages based  
15 on judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts,  
16 and lose their immunity only when they act "in the clear absence  
17 of all jurisdiction or perform[] an act outside [their]  
18 'judicial' capacity." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th  
19 Cir. 1986) (en banc).

20 "[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a  
21 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,  
22 whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to  
23 the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with  
24

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25  
26 <sup>1</sup>Although this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants, the court retains authority to dismiss plaintiff's claims against those defendants on other grounds. Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 1990).

1 the judge in his judicial capacity." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.  
2 349, 362 (1978). "[A]bsolute immunity insulates judges from  
3 charges of erroneous acts or irregular actions, even when it is  
4 alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt  
5 motives, or when the exercise of judicial authority is 'flawed by  
6 the commission of grave procedural errors.'" In re Castillo, 297  
7 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)).

8       Allowing this action to proceed against the defendant judges  
9 would defeat the purpose of absolute immunity, which "is to 'free  
10 the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation  
11 associated with litigation.'" Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832,  
12 837 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and emphasis omitted). All the  
13 alleged misconduct concerns judicial acts, such as dismissing  
14 cases before trial. I dismiss plaintiff's claims against the  
15 defendant judges with prejudice.

#### 16       **B. Defendant Prosecutors**

17       Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit when "performing  
18 functions that require the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."  
19 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997). Discretionary  
20 functions include the prosecutor's "determination that the  
21 evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause  
22 finding, her decision to file charges, and her presentation of  
23 the information and the motion to the court." Id. at 130.  
24 Prosecutorial immunity applies "even if it leaves 'the genuinely  
25 wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor  
26 whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.'"



1 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.  
2 409, 427 (1976)).

3 Here, the misconduct alleged by plaintiff concerns  
4 inherently prosecutorial decisions, such as whether to file  
5 criminal charges. The defendant prosecutors' actions are  
6 protected by absolute immunity. Otherwise, it would be a  
7 declaration of open season on prosecutors whenever a person  
8 disagrees with a prosecutor's decision to file, or not to file,  
9 charges. Plaintiff cannot plead facts that could possibly  
10 support her claims against the defendant prosecutors, so those  
11 claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

### 12 **C. Clerical and Administrative Defendants**

13 Plaintiff names court clerks and staff in state and federal  
14 courts as defendants. For example, she alleges that "clerks"  
15 obstructed justice and encouraged organized crime and corruption  
16 "by not entering defaults, by entering motions to dismiss as  
17 'answers,' by entering prohibited pre-trial motions, or by  
18 altering the sequence of events (numbers and entry dates) while  
19 supposedly 'correctly docketing a case.'" First Am. Compl. at  
20 46. Plaintiff also asserts claims for alleged violations of the  
21 federal Clerk's Manual Code of Conduct and Attorney Admissions  
22 Procedures.

23 Court clerks and administrators are entitled to absolute  
24 immunity from liability for damages "when they perform tasks that  
25 are an integral part of the judicial process." Mullis v. United  
26 States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)

1 (court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity regarding  
2 filing a decision). See also Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240,  
3 1244 (9th Cir. 1996); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th  
4 Cir. 1979) (court clerk's "failure . . . to perform a ministerial  
5 duty [giving notice of order] which was a part of judicial  
6 process is also clothed with quasi-judicial immunity").

7 Here, the alleged misconduct by the defendant clerks and  
8 other court employees concern tasks that are "an integral part of  
9 the judicial process." All the named court clerks and other  
10 judicial employees are entitled to absolute immunity.

11 I note that in plaintiff's complaint and briefs, she appears  
12 to assert a constitutional right to have her claims tried to a  
13 jury. There is no such unqualified right. Granting a properly  
14 supported motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment does  
15 not violate a litigant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.  
16 See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990)  
17 (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does  
18 not violate right to jury trial); Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co.,  
19 831 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The very existence of a  
20 summary judgment provision demonstrates that no right to a jury  
21 trial exists unless there is a genuine issue of material fact  
22 suitable for a jury to resolve.").

### 23 **III. Eleventh Amendment Immunity**

24 Plaintiffs asserts claims against several state entities,  
25 such as the offices of the attorney general for Texas and  
26 Florida. These claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity

1 and must be dismissed. See Forster v. County of Santa Barbara,  
2 896 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Will v.  
3 Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) ("'arms of  
4 the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" are not liable under  
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v.  
6 Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987).

#### 7 **IV. Failure to State a Claim**

8 A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the  
9 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.  
10 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts,  
11 cannot support a claim. See Jones v. Community Redevelopment  
12 Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)  
13 (citing Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)).  
14 A plaintiff must specifically allege the conduct of the  
15 defendants giving rise to the claim. Id.

16 In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a  
17 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court  
18 takes allegations of material fact as true and construes them in  
19 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Mishler v.  
20 Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999). The court should not  
21 dismiss the complaint "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the  
22 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that  
23 would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id.

24 "To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's  
25 constitutional rights . . . , the plaintiff must state specific  
26 facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy." Burns

1 v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (per  
2 curiam). Claims based on vague and conclusory conspiracy  
3 allegations, which fail to specify each defendant's role in the  
4 alleged conspiracy, are subject to dismissal. Pena v. Gardner,  
5 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,  
6 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991).

7 Here, plaintiff has attempted to support her racketeering  
8 and civil rights claims with conclusory allegations. She has not  
9 alleged facts concerning the role of each defendant in the  
10 alleged racketeering enterprise or the alleged conspiracy to  
11 violate civil rights. She has not shown any connection between  
12 the various defendants, other than the basic fact that they are  
13 all associated with the legal process in one role or another.  
14 Plaintiff's allegations that property owners in different states  
15 were prosecuted for trumped-up violations of animal welfare  
16 regulations does not show, without more, that prosecutors in  
17 different states were part of a vast conspiracy. Similarly,  
18 plaintiff's allegations that courts dismissed legal challenges to  
19 the alleged baseless prosecutions does not show that courts were  
20 also part of the conspiracy. There is a simpler explanation:  
21 the courts concluded independently that the lawsuits were not  
22 legally sufficient.

23 All of plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for failure to  
24 state a claim. Given the nature of plaintiff's complaint, I  
25 conclude that she could not possibly plead a viable claim.  
26 Dismissal for failure to state a claim is therefore with

1 prejudice. See Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d  
2 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986).

### 3 **V. Statute of Limitations**

4 The only alleged injuries that were suffered by plaintiff  
5 herself occurred when state or local authorities allegedly seized  
6 her property and dismissed her subsequent legal action before  
7 trial. The federal civil rights statute at issue here, 42 U.S.C.  
8 § 1983, does not contain statute of limitations, so federal  
9 courts borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for  
10 personal injury claims. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991  
11 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, a one-year statute of  
12 limitations applies. Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th  
13 Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's claims against federal defendants are  
14 subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as her claims  
15 against state defendants. See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406,  
16 410 (9th Cir. 1991).

17 "Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows  
18 or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the  
19 action." TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. The district court may  
20 dismiss for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations  
21 grounds "'only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the  
22 required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that  
23 the statute was tolled.'" Id. (quoting Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927  
24 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991)).

25 Plaintiff alleges that her property was illegally seized and  
26 that her legal action was improperly dismissed more than six

1 years before this complaint was filed. First Am. Compl., Exh. A,  
2 at 7. Any claim based on plaintiff's prior dispute with state  
3 and local authorities is barred by California's one-year statute  
4 of limitations.

5 **VI. Sanctions Against Plaintiff**

6 Several defendants seek sanctions against plaintiff. I will  
7 issue a separate show cause order on this issue.

8 **CONCLUSION**

9 Defendants' motions to dismiss ( see attachments 1a-4a ) are  
10 granted. Plaintiff's claims as to alleged third-party victims  
11 are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter  
12 jurisdiction; plaintiff's claims against defendants domiciled  
13 outside of California are dismissed without prejudice for lack of  
14 personal jurisdiction; and the entire complaint is dismissed with  
15 prejudice for failure to state a claim. All other pending  
16 motions are denied as moot.

17 DATED this 28 day of May, 2003.

18  
19  
20 

21 OWEN M. PANNER  
22 U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
23  
24  
25  
26

# Civil Pending Motions

Central District of California

Honorable Owen M. Panner presiding

Case #	Title	NOS/Cause	Filed/ Reopened
Document	Motion Text	Dates	
5:02cv00691	Janet I Fischer v. Admin Offices of the Clerk:am	NOS: 890,Other Statutory Actions Cause: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act	07/09/02
[6-1]	By dft USA to dismiss FAC	Hearing: set 09/23/02 Response: Last filed: 08/05/02[20-1] Reply: Last filed: 11/27/02[486-1]	08/22/02
[7-1]	By dft Brin & Brin, et al for order to specially set jnt briefing sched for dfts to ans or otherwise respd to plfs FAC	Response: Last filed: 11/18/02[451-1] Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[451-1]	08/30/02
[8-1]	By dft Allen Stein Powers to dismiss	Hearing: set 09/30/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[450-1]	09/03/02
[9-1]	By dft Lea & Chamberlain to dismiss for ord for security & control & for sanctions	Hearing: set 12/02/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/23/02[512-1]	09/03/02
[12-1]	By dft City Atty Anaheim to dismiss for failure to state a clm upon which relief can be granted	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[458-1]	09/04/02
[12-2]	By dft City Atty Anaheim to strike cmp for failure to com;y w/FRCP 8 & for ords for securitys & control	Hearing: set 09/30/02	09/04/02
[15-1]	By dft County Cnsl Orange to dismiss for improper venue in lieu of answer or in the alt mot to transfer for forum non conveniens by dft	Hearing: set 09/30/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[454-1]	09/04/02
[16-1]	By dft County Cnsl Orange to dismiss actn for failure to state a clm upon which relief cna be granted	Hearing: set 10/07/02	09/04/02
[18-1]	By dft Holland & Knight to dismiss	Hearing: set 10/07/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/09/02[495-1]	09/04/02
[22-1]	By dft City Prosecutor Ofc to dismiss plfs FAC	Hearing: set 10/07/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/05/02[490-1]	09/05/02
[24-1]	By dft McHale & Conner to dismiss FAC	Hearing: set 09/30/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[448-1]	09/06/02

[25-1]	By dft Dist Atty Ofc Denton to dismiss	Hearing: set 09/30/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[457-1]	09/09/02
[173-1]	By dft Jackson & Walker LLP to dismiss FAC	Hearing: set 10/07/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/09/02[494-1]	09/11/02
[176-1]	By dft Feess, et al to extend time to ans or plead in resp to the cmp		09/12/02
[178-1]	By dft Jenkins & Gilchrist to dismiss for order for security & control & for sanctions	Hearing: set 12/09/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/10/02[496-1]	09/16/02
[182-1]	By dft Allen Stein Powers for leave to proceed w/o local cnsl	Hearing: set 10/21/02	09/16/02
[186-1]	By dft James Richard Hooper to dismiss FAC	Hearing: set 10/21/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/05/02[491-1]	09/20/02
[188-1]	By dft Swart, et al to dismiss FAC	Hearing: set 10/21/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[469-1]	09/23/02
[192-1]	By dft Wald & Associates to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction & insufficiency of svc of process	Hearing: set 10/28/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/03/02[488-1]	09/27/02
[195-1]	By dft Thomas & Libowitz to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction	Hearing: set 10/21/02 Reply: Last filed: 12/05/02[492-1]	09/27/02
[199-1]	By dft Noble to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[453-1]	10/07/02
[200-1]	By dft Sayles & Lidji to dismiss FAC & for ord for security & control	Hearing: set 12/09/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[463-1]	10/07/02
[201-1]	By dft Godwin White & Grube to dismiss FAC & for order for security & control	Hearing: set 12/09/02 Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[461-1]	10/07/02
[203-1]	By dft Gorham to dismiss or in the alt mot to req a more definie stnt	Response: Last filed: 12/13/02[502-1] Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[449-1]	09/05/02
[206-1]	By dft Griffen Whitten & to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[472-1]	09/11/02
[208-1]	By dft Carrington & Carring to dismiss under rule 12(b)	Reply: Last filed: 12/12/02[501-1]	09/03/02
[210-1]	By dft Griffen Whitten & to dismiss		09/13/02
[212-1]	By dft Kee to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[464-1]	09/03/02
[214-1]	By dft Matthews Calton Stei to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[452-1]	09/13/02
[216-1]	By dft Griffen Whitten & to dismiss		09/11/02
[218-1]	By dft Nix Holtsford Gill to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[447-1]	08/30/02
[220-1]	By dft Jones Kurth & Andrew to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[455-1]	09/03/02
[222-1]	By dft Bennet & Weston to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 11/18/02[456-1]	09/17/02
[224-1]	By dft Lemler & Associates to dismiss	Reply: Last filed: 12/16/02[500-1]	09/10/02



[226-1]	By dft Fernando Ramos Law to dismiss	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 11/18/02[465-1]	09/03/02
[235-1]	By dft Jones Kurth & Andrew to dismiss	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 11/18/02[455-1]	10/01/02
[236-1]	By dft Griffen Whitten & to dismiss	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 11/18/02[472-1]	09/19/02
[245-1]	By dft Beckworth & Carrigan to dismiss	<b>Hearing: set 10/21/02</b> <b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/26/02[517-1]	10/22/02
[247-1]	By dft Cullum Law Firm to dismiss FAC	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/13/02[505-1]	10/24/02
[252-1]	By dft Wolfe Clark Henderso to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction insufficiency of service of process & improper venue	<b>Response:</b> Last filed: 12/23/02[513-1] <b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/13/02[506-1]	09/16/02
[253-1]	By dft Wolfe Clark Henderso for attorney Clark H McCoy Jr to appear pro hac vice		09/16/02
[423-1]	By dft Lindley to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/13/02[507-1]	11/04/02
[425-1]	By dft Christian to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/13/02[508-1]	11/04/02
[427-1]	By dft Kirkpatrick & Lockha, et al to dismiss	<b>Reply:</b> Last filed: 12/13/02[509-1]	11/12/02
[440-1]	By dft Admin Offices of the to extend time to answer move or plead in resp to the FAC pending decision on the mot to dismiss of USA		11/06/02
[442-1]	By pla Fischer to strike statutorily req by rule 5,7,11,12 & 37 & ord of 4/22/93 & ord of 4/19/00		11/13/02
[446-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against atty Fred Carrington		11/18/02
[447-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Alex L Holtsford Jr		11/18/02
[448-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Bruce Janger		11/18/02
[449-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Robert Schell		11/18/02
[450-1]	By dft Allen Stein Powers, et al for entry of default as to Allen Stein & Durbin PC	<b>Response:</b> Last filed: 12/16/02[499-1]	11/18/02
[452-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Matthews Carlton Stein Shiels Pearce & Knott LLP		11/18/02
[453-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Angela Dickerson Nickel		11/18/02
[454-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Thomas L Wilson		11/18/02
[455-1]	By dft Jones Kurth & Andrew, et al for entry of default as to Jones Kurth & Andrews		11/18/02
[456-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Bennett Weston & LaJone PC		11/18/02
[457-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Robert Schell		11/18/02
[458-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Moses W Johnson		11/18/02
[459-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Huey P Cotton		11/18/02
[460-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Michele Beal Bagneris		11/18/02
[461-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty James A Pranske		11/18/02
[462-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Joel Siegel		11/18/02

[463-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty James A Pranske		11/18/02
[464-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against James L Kee		11/18/02
[465-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Fernando Ramos		11/18/02
[466-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Wald & Associates		11/18/02
[467-1]	By dft Lemler & Associates, et al for entry of default as to Lemler & Associates		11/18/02
[468-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Jenkens & Gilchrist		11/18/02
[469-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Elizabeth S Angres		11/18/02
[470-1]	By dft Holland & Knight, et al for entry of default as to Holland & Knight		11/18/02
[471-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Michael E Williams		11/18/02
[472-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Griffin Whitten & Jones		11/18/02
[473-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions against Atty Marc C Forsythe		11/18/02
[479-1]	By dft Holland & Knight for ord extending time to plead		11/22/02
[498-1]	By dft Dist Atty Ofc Denton to strike or in the alt req for leave to late file reply in suppt of mot to dismiss & reply to mot to dismiss		12/12/02
[503-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & threat to victim witness & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from co dft Timlin in viol of ord of 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/00		12/13/02
[504-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Pannor in viol of ord 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/00		12/13/02
[505-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Pannor in viol of ord of 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/00		12/13/02
[506-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7 (b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Panner in viol of ord of 4/22/93 & ord 4/17/00		12/13/02
[507-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Panner in viol of ord of 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/00		12/13/02
[508-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Panner in viol of ord 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/02		12/13/02
[509-1]	By pla Fischer for sanctions for rule 7(b)(3) improper mot practice & attempt to bribe & procure judicial act from Panner in viol of ord of 4/22/93 & ord of 4/17/00		12/13/02
[515-1]	By dft Griffen Whitten & for attorney Michael J Whitten to appear pro hac vice		12/23/02
[519-1]	By dft McDonald Sanders to set aside entry of default	Hearing: set 01/21/03	12/30/02
[526-1]	By dft Kinkle Rodiger to dismiss	Hearing: set 03/03/03	01/23/03
[538-1]	By dft Fields & Creason, et al to set aside entry of default	Hearing: set 04/14/03	03/11/03
[540-1]	By dft Fields & Creason, et al to set aside entry of default	Hearing: set 04/14/03	03/11/03
[542-1]	By dft Christian to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.		03/24/03
[544-1]	By dft Lindley to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted		03/24/03

[555-1] By dft Canteley & Hanger LLP, to dismiss  
90 motions meeting search criteria

nunc pro tunc  
4-4-03  
fld 5-30-03

End of Report