

1 JEREMY D. SACKS, CA Bar No. 174839
2 jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
3 STOEL RIVES LLP
4 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000
5 Portland, OR 97205
6 Telephone: 503.224.3380

7 MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar No. 190938
8 matthew.segal@stoel.com
9 STOEL RIVES LLP
10 500 Capitol Mall
11 Sacramento, CA 95814
12 Telephone: 916.447.0700

13 JOHN HILL, *pro hac vice* forthcoming
14 jhill@citizensforethics.org
15 DONALD SHERMAN, *pro hac vice*
16 forthcoming
17 dsherman@citizensforethics.org
18 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
19 Washington
20 1331 F Street NW, Suite 900
21 Washington, DC 20004
22 Telephone: 202.408.5565

23 *Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Bipartisan
24 Former Secretaries of State*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Proposed *Amici* move for leave to file the attached amicus brief in support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 37) (the "Motion"), and state as follows:

Proposed *Amici* are a bipartisan group of former state secretaries of state for Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. As the former chief election administrators in their respective states, they are uniquely familiar with states' crucial role in regulating and administering federal elections. The Proposed *Amici* should be granted leave to file the accompanying brief because of their unique insight into the states' role in administering elections, which addresses a matter central to this challenge and is offered from a perspective that is not otherwise provided by the parties.

No party's counsel has authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity, other than Proposed *Amici* or their counsel, has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

II. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

“Whether to allow Amici to file a brief is solely within the Court’s discretion, and generally courts have ‘exercised great liberality.’” *Andrikos v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n*, No. 2:19-CV-10421-GW (JCX), [2021 WL 12323931](#), at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2021); *accord City of Costa Mesa v. United States*, No. 820CV00368JLSJDE, [2020 WL 2048586](#), at *3 fn. 6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2020) (stating same). “A court may grant leave to appear as an amicus if the information offered is ‘timely and useful.’” *Raiser v. Kleeger*, No. CV 21-9344-DSF (KK), [2022 WL 2903133](#), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2022). “District courts frequently welcome amicus briefs from non-parties concerning legal issues that have potential ramifications beyond the parties directly involved or if the amicus has ‘unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.’” *NGV*

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF
BIPARTISAN FORMER STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

1 *Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC*, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D.
2 Cal. 2005) (quoting *Cobell v. Norton*, 246 F.Supp.2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2003)). The
3 “classic role” of amicus curiae is to “assist[] in a case of general public interest,
4 supplement[] the efforts of counsel, and draw[] the court’s attention to law that
5 escaped consideration.” *Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus. State of*
6 *Mont.*, 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982).

7 **III. REASONS WHY MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED**

8 The Court should exercise its discretion to permit Proposed *Amici* to file the
9 attached amicus brief. Counsel for *Amici* are familiar with the scope of the
10 arguments presented by the parties and will not unduly repeat those arguments.
11 Instead, the proposed brief, informed by Proposed *Amici*’s expertise and direct
12 experience faithfully overseeing elections, will assist the Court in its consideration
13 of the Motion by shedding additional light on the states’ pivotal role in enacting and
14 executing election laws. The brief proceeds by arguing that the U.S. Constitution
15 assigns states—not the federal government—the primary role in regulating and
16 administering federal elections. It next explains that Congress, through the National
17 Voter Registration Act (the “NVRA”) and the Help America Vote Act (the
18 “HAVA”), reaffirmed states’ authority over voter roll maintenance. The brief then
19 explains that voter files contain sensitive information that states must protect, and
20 that no federal law requires disclosure of such data. Finally, it argues that forcing
21 states to share this information creates privacy and cybersecurity risks and violates
22 the Federal Privacy Act. As bipartisan former officials from states that both elect
23 and appoint secretaries of state, Proposed *Amici* have a diverse range of

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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF
BIPARTISAN FORMER STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 perspectives. Proposed *Amici* also share a common commitment to ensuring that
2 elections are free and fair and support the Motion.

3 As the United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded in
4 granting an overlapping group of Amici leave to file a similar amicus brief in
5 litigation challenging an executive order related to similar issues, “[a]s former state
6 election officials, [A]mici offer a unique perspective not presented by the parties.
7 And their proposed brief is relevant and helpful.” Minute Order, *League of United*
8 *Latin American Citizens, et al. v. Executive office of the President, et al.*, No. 25-
9 946, (April 24, 2025) (“LULAC”); *see also California v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d
10 359, 391, 392 (D. Mass. 2025) (granting overlapping amici leave to file amicus
11 brief in case raising similar issues).

12 Counsel for Proposed *Amici* have conferred with counsel for the parties.
13 Plaintiff and Defendants take no position on the motion to leave.

14 **IV. CONCLUSION**

15 For these reasons, Proposed *Amici* respectfully requests that the Court grant it
16 leave to file the amicus brief attached as Exhibit B.

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27 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
28 AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF
BIPARTISAN FORMER STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

1 DATED: November 26, 2025

STOEL RIVES LLP

2 */s/ Matthew D. Segal*

3 JEREMY SACKS, CA Bar No. 174839
4 STOEL RIVES LLP
5 jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
6 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000
7 Portland, OR 97205
8 Telephone: 503.224.3380

9 MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar No. 190938
10 matthew.segal@stoel.com
11 STOEL RIVES LLP
12 500 Capitol Mall
13 Sacramento, CA 95814
14 Telephone: 916.447.0700

15 *Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Bipartisan
16 Former Secretaries of State*

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27 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
28 AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF
BIPARTISAN FORMER STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

EXHIBIT A

1 JEREMY D. SACKS, CA Bar No. 174839
jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
2 STOEL RIVES LLP
760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000
3 Portland, OR 97205
Telephone: 503.224.3380

5 MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar No. 190938
matthew.segal@stoel.com
6 STOEL RIVES LLP
500 Capitol Mall
7 Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: 916.447.0700

8 JOHN HILL, *pro hac vice* forthcoming
jhill@citizensforethics.org
9 DONALD SHERMAN, *pro hac vice*
forthcoming
10 dsherman@citizensforethics.org
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
11 Washington
12 1331 F Street NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: 202.408.5565

13 *Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Bipartisan Former*
14 *Secretaries of State*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

18 || UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

19 Plaintiff,

V.

21 SHIRLEY WEBER, in her official
22 capacity as Secretary of the State of
23 California and the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,

24 Defendants.

Case No. 2:25-CV-09149-DOC-ADS

**DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
JEREMY D. SACKS UNDER
LOCAL RULE 7-3**

26 || I, Jeremy D. Sacks, hereby declare as follows:

27 1. I am a U.S. citizen, over the age of 18, am competent to testify, and
28 have personal knowledge of the facts and information set forth in this declaration.

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
JEREMY D. SACKS UNDER LOCAL
RULE 7-3

1 2. I am an attorney at Stoel Rives LLP and am counsel for the proposed
2 amicus curiae in this matter.


3 3. Proposed amicus curiae made a good-faith attempt to confer with
4 counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants about relief sought by this Motion, as required
5 by Local Rule 7-3.

6 4. On November 19, 2025, I conferred by telephone with Plaintiff's
7 counsel regarding this motion. By email received on November 21, 2025, Plaintiff's
8 counsel indicated that they take no position on this Motion for Leave to File as
9 Amicus Curiae.

10 5. On November 13, 2025, my co-counsel, John Hill, conferred by
11 telephone with Defendants' counsel regarding this motion. Defendants' counsel
12 indicated they take no position on this Motion for Leave to File as Amicus Curiae.

13 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

14 Executed on November 26, 2025.

15 
16 _____
16 Jeremy D. Sacks

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DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
JEREMY D. SACKS UNDER LOCAL
RULE 7-3

151169709.1 0099880-01587

EXHIBIT B

1 JEREMY D. SACKS, CA Bar No. 174839
2 jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
3 STOEL RIVES LLP
4 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000
5 Portland, OR 97205
6 Telephone: 503.224.3380

7 MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar No. 190938
8 matthew.segal@stoel.com
9 STOEL RIVES LLP
10 500 Capitol Mall
11 Sacramento, CA 95814
12 Telephone: 916.447.0700

13 JOHN HILL, *pro hac vice* forthcoming
14 jhill@citizensforethics.org
15 DONALD SHERMAN, *pro hac vice*
16 forthcoming
17 dsherman@citizensforethics.org
18 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
19 Washington
20 1331 F Street NW, Suite 900
21 Washington, DC 20004
22 Telephone: 202.408.5565

23
24 *Attorneys for Amicus Curiae*

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26
27
28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

19 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
20 Plaintiff,

21 v.

22 SHIRLEY WEBER, in her official
23 capacity as Secretary of the State of
24 California and the STATE OF
25 CALIFORNIA,

26 Defendants.

27 Case No. 2:25-CV-09149-DOC-ADS

28 **BRIEF OF BIPARTISAN
FORMER STATE SECRETARIES
OF STATE AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 37)**

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32 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
33 DISMISS (ECF 37)

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28 BRIEF OF BIPARTISAN FORMER
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AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS ([ECF 37](#))

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28	BRIEF OF BIPARTISAN FORMER	
	STATE SECRETARIES OF STATE	
	AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF	
	DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO	
	DISMISS (ECF 37)	
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1 INTEREST OF AMICI

2 Amici are a bipartisan group of former state secretaries of state. As the
3 District Court for the District of Columbia concluded in granting Amici leave to file
4 a similar amicus brief in election-related litigation there, “[a]s former state election
5 officials, [A]mici offer a unique perspective not presented by the parties. And their
6 proposed brief is relevant and helpful.” Minute Order, *League of United Latin Am.*
7 *Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the President*, No. 1:25-cv-00946, (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2025).

8 Although Amici may not always have agreed about what constitutes the best
9 election policies, Amici nonetheless share a common commitment to ensuring that
10 elections are free and fair, and Amici are unified in their understanding of states’
11 pivotal role in enacting and executing election laws, as set forth in the U.S.
12 Constitution. Amici are:

13 **Mary Estill Buchanan, Former Secretary of State for the State of**
14 **Colorado** – The Colorado Secretary of State is an elected member of the Executive
15 Branch of Colorado’s state government. The Secretary of State serves as the chief
16 executive of an office that oversees and administers many laws, including the
17 Colorado Election Code, Voter Registration Laws, and Campaign Finance Laws.

18 Secretary Buchanan was a public servant in Colorado for many years and a
19 tireless advocate for democracy and women in public service. Most relevant here,
20 Buchanan served two terms as Colorado’s Secretary of State—from 1974 to 1983—
21 as a Republican. When she took office, she was the first woman to hold that office
22 in Colorado. During her tenure, Buchanan was the only Republican in statewide
23 office, working across the aisle to ensure efficient, effective administration of
24 Colorado’s elections. As Secretary, Buchanan advocated for and implemented
25 reforms to improve transparency for elections and public office.

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28 BRIEF OF BIPARTISAN FORMER
STATE SECRETARIES OF STATE
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS (ECF 37)

1 **Miles Rapoport, Former Secretary of State for the State of Connecticut –**

2 The Secretary of State of Connecticut is the Commissioner of Elections for the
3 State. The Secretary is charged with administering, interpreting, and implementing
4 election laws and ensuring fair and impartial elections. The Elections and Voting
5 Division of the office administers, interprets, and implements all state and federal
6 laws pertaining to elections, primaries, nominating procedures, and the acquisition
7 and exercise of voting rights.

8 Secretary Rapoport was elected Secretary of the State as a Democrat in 1995
9 and served until 1998, leading multiple initiatives to expand voting and election
10 participation. Before that, Rapoport served five terms in the Connecticut House of
11 Representatives, from 1984 to 1994, chairing the Committee on Elections. Since
12 2021 he has served as the Executive Director of 100% Democracy, an initiative
13 committed to promoting a more representative democracy. He is the co-author, with
14 *Washington Post* columnist E.J. Dionne, of *100% Democracy: The Case for*
15 *Universal Voting*, published in March 2022 by the New Press.

16 **Joan Anderson Growe, Former Secretary of State for the State of**

17 **Minnesota –** The Secretary of State of Minnesota is an elected constitutional
18 officer serving in the state’s executive branch. One of the office’s primary
19 responsibilities is overseeing statewide elections and operating the statewide voter
20 registration system.

21 Secretary Growe served first in the Minnesota House of Representatives
22 before being elected as Minnesota Secretary of State as a Democrat. When she was
23 elected, Growe became the first woman to be elected to a Minnesota statewide
24 office without having been first appointed. During her six-term tenure, Growe was
25 tireless in her advocacy of voter participation, and, for most of her tenure,
26 Minnesota led the nation in voter turnout.

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1 **John Gale, Former Secretary of State for the State of Nebraska** – The
2 Secretary of State serves as Nebraska’s chief election officer. Working with
3 election officials in the state’s 93 counties, the Elections Division oversees election
4 law, the conduct of elections in the state, election tabulation equipment and the state
5 voter registration system.

6 Secretary Gale served as Nebraska Secretary of State from December 2000
7 until 2019, winning election to the office as a Republican four times. While in
8 office he significantly improved Nebraska’s election process, including
9 implementing major election improvements in Nebraska to meet the requirements
10 of the federal Help America Vote Act. Gale promoted efforts to increase voter
11 participation, resulting in Nebraska setting new turnout records in both the 2004
12 and 2008 presidential elections. He also served several terms on the Executive
13 Committee for the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), multiple
14 terms as Chair of the International Relations Committee, and as Chair of the
15 Business Services Committee. Gale also served terms on both the Standards Board
16 and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee of the U.S. Elections
17 Assistance Commission.

18 **Phil Keisling, Former Secretary of State for the State of Oregon** – The
19 Oregon Secretary of State is an elected constitutional officer within the executive
20 branch of the state government. One of the Secretary’s chief roles is to oversee the
21 state’s election system, to maximize voter participation, and to protect ballot
22 security.

23 Secretary Keisling’s career over four decades has included stints in the
24 worlds of journalism, elective politics, the private sector, and academia. In 1991,
25 Keisling was appointed Oregon Secretary of State by Governor Barbara Roberts.
26 He was then elected and re-elected as a Democrat to this statewide position. During
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1 his tenure, he helped lead the successful effort to make Oregon the nation's first
2 state to conduct all elections only by mail. Keisling is also the chair of the board of
3 directors of the National Vote At Home Institute, a nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) nonprofit
4 organization that works to increase voters' access to, use of, and confidence in
5 mailed-out ballots.

6 **Kathy Boockvar, Former Secretary of the Commonwealth of**
7 **Pennsylvania** – The Secretary of the Commonwealth is the chief state election
8 official in Pennsylvania and leads the Pennsylvania Department of State. The
9 Department of State is responsible for ensuring the security, integrity, and
10 accessibility of the electoral process in Pennsylvania, by overseeing free, fair, and
11 accurate elections.

12 Secretary Boockvar served as the Secretary of the Commonwealth from 2019
13 until 2021, and before that as Senior Advisor on election security, under Governor
14 Tom Wolf (D). Boockvar was also co-chair of NASS's Elections Committee from
15 2019 to 2020, and a NASS Representative on the Election Infrastructure Subsector
16 Government Coordinating Council (EIS-GCC), a collaboration among federal,
17 state, and local officials. During her tenure, Boockvar co-chaired Pennsylvania's
18 Inter-Agency Election Security and Preparedness Workgroup, strengthened election
19 security and voting rights measures across the state, and oversaw secure and
20 accessible elections amid a global pandemic, marked by unparalleled transparency
21 and voter participation. In prior years, Boockvar served as a poll worker and as a
22 voting-rights attorney for a national civil rights organization and has been dedicated
23 to public service throughout her career. After serving as Secretary, Boockvar
24 became Vice President of Election Operations for the Center for Internet Security,
25 and she is currently President of Athena Strategies, continuing work to strengthen
26 election security and amplify understanding and civil discourse about elections.

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1 **Sam Reed, Former Secretary of State for the State of Washington** – The
2 Secretary of State of Washington is the state’s chief elections officer. The Secretary
3 of State serves as an elected constitutional officer with rule-making authority. The
4 duties of the office included maintaining the statewide voter registration database,
5 overseeing state and local elections, certifying the results of state primaries and
6 general elections, filing and verifying statewide initiatives and referendums, and
7 producing and distributing the state voters’ pamphlet and election-notice legal
8 advertising.

9 Secretary Reed served the citizens of Washington for over three decades in
10 elected public office. At the age of 28, Reed was appointed assistant Secretary of
11 State, and was chosen by Governor Dan Evans to head the Governor's Advisory
12 Council on Urban Affairs. Reed was elected as a Republican to serve as
13 Washington's fourteenth Secretary of State in 2000—a title which he held until his
14 retirement in January 2013. His many accomplishments included major election
15 reform, including a new statewide voter registration system that prevents
16 opportunity for fraud.

I. INTRODUCTION

18 Amici—a bipartisan group of former secretaries of state—faithfully oversaw
19 elections across the “laboratories” of electoral democracy—the states. *Ariz. State*
20 *Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 817 (2015). In their
21 roles, Amici witnessed firsthand the Framers’ wisdom in giving states authority to
22 enact election laws and administer elections, as set forth in the Elections Clause of
23 the U.S. Constitution. That is because, as the Supreme Court recognized in
24 reaffirming the states’ role under the Elections Clause, “[d]eference to state
25 lawmaking allows local policies more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
26 heterogeneous society, permits innovation and experimentation, enables greater

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1 citizen involvement in democratic processes, and makes government more
2 responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” *Id.* at 817
3 (cleaned up).

4 In this action, the United States seeks an order directing the Secretary of
5 State of California and the State of California to turnover to the U.S Department of
6 Justice a computerized voter registration list of nearly 23 million registered voters,
7 inclusive of “all fields.” Compl. at 16, ¶ 5. That action would upend our
8 constitutional framework by interfering with California’s management of its voter
9 registration system and protection of sensitive voter information, including driver’s
10 license and social security numbers. The Government’s demand is contrary to the
11 federalism and separation of powers principles codified in the Constitution’s
12 Elections Clause and contrary to federal law.

13 Amici, therefore, submit this brief to protect these fundamental
14 Constitutional principles and to ensure the integrity of California’s voter
15 registration records. Amici respectfully request that the Court grant Defendants’
16 motion to dismiss.

17 II. ARGUMENT

18 **A. The states, not the federal government, are charged with administering
19 federal elections.**

20 **1. The U.S. Constitution mandates the states’ role in regulating and
21 administering elections.**

22 The Constitution explicitly gives states, not the federal government, the
23 primary responsibility to enact election laws and administer elections. The
24 **Elections Clause** establishes: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
25 for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed *in each State by the*
26 *Legislature thereof*; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such

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1 Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl.
2 1 (emphasis added).¹

3 The Constitution thus empowers the states with “sweeping” authority to
4 enact election laws, subject only to other provisions of the Constitution and
5 preemption by Congress. *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the*
6 *President (“LULAC”),* 780 F. Supp. 3d 135, 158 (D.D.C. 2025). The Elections
7 Clause’s “substantive scope is broad. ‘Times, Places, and Manner,’ . . . are
8 ‘comprehensive words,’ which ‘embrace authority to provide a *complete* code for
9 congressional elections. . . .’” *Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.*
10 (“*ITCA*”), 570 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting *Smiley v. Holm*, 285
11 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)) (emphasis added); *California v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 359,
12 372 (D. Mass. 2025) (same). The Elections Clause therefore “has two functions. [1]
13 Upon the States it imposes the duty (‘shall be prescribed’) to prescribe the time,
14 place, and manner of electing Representatives and Senators; [and 2] upon Congress
15 it confers the power to alter those regulations or supplant them altogether.” *Arizona*,
16 570 U.S. at 8 (citing *U.S. Term Limits*, 514 U.S. at 804-05); *see also Moore v.*
17 *Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 29 (2023) (states hold “constitutional duty to craft the rules
18 governing federal elections.”). “In other words, only Congress has the power to
19 adjust state election rules.” *California*, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 379.²

20 In addition to assigning states the primary responsibility to regulate elections,
21 the current regime enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause also makes states

22

¹ A state’s “duty” under the Elections Clause “parallels the duty” described in
23 the separate but related Electors Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. *See U.S. Term*
24 *Limits, Inc. v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779, 804-05 (1995).

25 ² Similarly, the Electors Clause empowers state legislatures—not the
26 President or the federal government—to determine the rules for appointing electors.
27 The state’s power under the Elector’s Clause is “plenary” within constitutional
28 limits. *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). “Congress is empowered to
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1 responsible for administering federal elections. The Elections Clause “places the
2 burden of administering federal elections on the states.” *Ass’n of Cnty. Orgs. for*
3 *Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar*, 56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995); *Harkless v.*
4 *Brunner*, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008); *accord Gonzalez v. Arizona*, 677 F.3d
5 383, 391 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] state’s role in the creation and implementation of
6 federal election procedures . . . is to administer the elections through its own
7 procedures.”), *aff’d sub nom. ITCA*, 570 U.S. 1 (2013); *ITCA*, 570 U.S. at 41 (Alito,
8 J., dissenting) (stating Elections Clause “reserve[es] to the States default
9 responsibility for administering federal elections . . .”).

10 In sum, it is “clearly established” that the Constitution “leave[s] the conduct
11 of [federal elections] to state laws, administered by state officers,” subject only to
12 Congress’ power “to regulate such elections . . . by positive and clear statutes.”
13 *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917).

14 **2. The Constitution prioritizes the states’ accountability to voters.**

15 The Elections Clause reflects the Framers’ view that, given state officials’
16 accountability and proximity to local needs, states are well-situated to regulate and
17 administer federal elections, subject only to Congressional preemption. “All other
18 things being equal, it is generally better for states to administer elections. . . .
19 [L]ocal administration . . . allows for greater individual input and accountability; a
20 distant bureaucracy is in danger of appearing out of reach and out of touch.”
21 *Libertarian Party of Va. v. Alcorn*, 826 F.3d 708, 715-16 (4th Cir. 2016). As James
22 Madison explained, “[i]t was found necessary to leave the regulation of [federal
23 elections], in the first place, to the state governments, as being best acquainted with
24 the situation of the people.” 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 312
25 (Max Farrand ed. 1911); *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 484; *ITCA*, 570 U.S. at 41 (Alito, J.,
26 dissenting). Even ardent federalist Alexander Hamilton conceded that, because the
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1 states are closer to the people, state regulation of federal elections is “in ordinary
2 cases . . . both more convenient and more satisfactory.” The Federalist No. 59,
3 p. 360 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); *accord Gradwell*, 243
4 U.S. at 484-85; *ITCA*, 570 U.S. at 41 (Alito, J., dissenting); *LULAC*, 780 F. Supp.
5 3d at 159. And although the Constitution allows Congress to act as a check on a
6 runaway state legislature’s regulation of elections, nowhere does it authorize the
7 President to do so without clear authorization from the legislative branch. *See*
8 *generally Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 484-85. There is no such authorization here.
9 In fact, as discussed below, Congress has prohibited the federal government’s
10 attempted actions here.

11 **3. State officials’ election expertise surpasses that of the President.**

12 In practice, the Elections Clause creates a regime in which state officials, like
13 Amici, possess unique expertise in local election procedures that the federal
14 government, and in particular the President, simply does not have. “[T]here must be
15 a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort
16 of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” *Storer v.*
17 *Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). Unlike the federal government, states have
18 “comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most
19 substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place,
20 and manner of holding primary and general elections, the registration and
21 qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates.” *Id.*
22 Consequently, state and local officials like Amici—*i.e.*, those charged with
23 developing and enforcing those comprehensive election codes—possess the
24 “expertise” necessary to implement such a complex system. *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S.
25 98, 109 (2000).

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1 **4. The NVRA and HAVA confirm states' authority over voter roll**
2 **list maintenance.**

3 Congress and the President recognized this truth when they adopted the
4 National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) and the Help America Vote Act
5 (“HAVA”). The NVRA was enacted in 1993 to help increase voter registration by,
6 among other things, requiring states to offer voter registration opportunities when
7 individuals apply for or renew a driver’s license. *See, e.g.*, Congressional Research
8 Service, *Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of*
9 *1993 (NVRA) and Subsequent Developments* (updated Feb. 7, 2025). HAVA was
10 enacted in 2002 to help states modernize their election systems in response to
11 voting problems in the 2000 presidential election. *Id.* Both statutes reaffirmed the
12 states’ authority over election management. The NVRA and HAVA provide federal
13 assistance to state election officials, but they do not limit the states’ plenary
14 authority over election management.

15 Under both the NVRA and HAVA, the states—not federal agencies—are
16 responsible for voter roll list maintenance. In interpreting the NVRA and HAVA,
17 the courts must “interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes
18 Congress sought to serve.” *Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rts. Org.*, 441 U.S. 600,
19 608 (1979); *see also Burrage v. United States*, 571 U.S. 204, 218 (2014) (“The role
20 of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other
21 approach might accord with good policy.” (citation omitted)). Specifically, a court’s
22 “inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is
23 unambiguous.” *BedRoc Ltd. v. United States*, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). “It is a
24 ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
25 read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”
26 *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting

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1 *Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury*, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Here, the text of both
2 the NVRA and HAVA is unequivocal: *States* are responsible for voter roll list
3 maintenance. Specifically, the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4), provides that “each
4 **State** shall ... conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove
5 the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters....” (emphasis
6 added). The NVRA’s “text unambiguously mandates that the *states* maintain a
7 ‘general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible
8 voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of’ only two things: death
9 or change of address.” *Bellitto v. Snipes*, 935 F.3d 1192, 1200 (11th Cir. 2019)
10 (emphasis added) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)).

11 The same is true regarding HAVA, which repeatedly requires states to
12 define, maintain, and administer voter lists. *See 52 U.S.C. §§ 21083(a)(1)(A);*
13 21083(a)(4)(A); *see also Am. Civ. Rts. Union v. Phila. City Comm’rs*, 872 F.3d
14 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Similar to the NVRA, the HAVA requires *states* to
15 ‘perform list maintenance’ of the computerized voting rolls.” (emphasis added))
16 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(2)(A)).

17 Because the text of the NVRA and HAVA makes clear that states are
18 charged with voter roll list maintenance, any interpretation to the contrary must be
19 rejected. Further, “[n]owhere in the language or structure of HAVA as a whole is
20 there any indication that the Congress intended to strip from the States their
21 traditional responsibility to administer elections” *Sandusky Cnty. Democratic*
22 *Party v. Blackwell*, 387 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2004).³ The NVRA, which

23
24 ³ As Senator Mitch McConnell explained earlier this year: “[D]elegation of
25 authority over election administration is crystal clear. Elections may have national
26 consequences but the power to conduct them rests in state capitols.” Mitch
27 McConnell, *Trump Gives Democrats a Voting Gift*, Wall St. J. (Apr. 7, 2025),
<https://archive.ph/30TWq> (“When we wrote the Help America Vote Act, we took
care to reinforce—not undermine—the limits of federal involvement in America’s
elections.”).

1 primarily achieves its objectives by “creating national registration requirements for
2 federal elections,” *Fish v. Kobach*, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1113 (D. Kan. 2016),
3 likewise authorizes, and relies on, the states to implement and facilitate its
4 provisions. Specifically, the very “purpose of the federal [voter registration] form is
5 *not* to supplant the States’ authority in this area but to facilitate interstate voter
6 registration drives.” *ITCA*, 570 U.S. at 46 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added);
7 William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the National Voter Registration Act of
8 1993 (May 20, 1993), <https://perma.cc/AHT3-H4S8> (describing NVRA’s
9 “implementation by States”).

10 In short, through the NVRA and HAVA, Congress granted *states*, not the
11 federal government, authority to administer voter roll lists. This Court must give
12 full effect to Congress’ intent.

13 **B. State voter files contain sensitive information that states must protect to
14 ensure voters’ privacy.**

15 There is no question that each state’s voter files contain sensitive nonpublic
16 information about voters, which states have both a right and an obligation to
17 protect. Federal law requires that every voter registration application for registration
18 in a federal election contain *at least* the voter’s driver’s license (“DL”) number, the
19 last four digits of the voter’s social security number (“SSN”), or other unique
20 identifying information. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)(A). In addition, voter files
21 commonly include additional nonpublic information about voters beyond what is
22 federally mandated, such as addresses, phone numbers, birth dates, and full SSNs.
23 *See, e.g.* National Conference of State Legislatures, *Access to and Use of Voter
24 Registration Lists* (updated July 17, 2025), <https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists> (aggregating information
25 about the contents of state voter rolls). This information is generally not publicly
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1 available; states have an interest in protecting such information from disclosure.
2 *See, e.g., Thornhill v. State of Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 105, (1940) (“[T]he duty of
3 the State” to protect privacy of its residents “cannot be doubted”).
4

5 In fact, many states have enacted statutes either prohibiting disclosure of
6 confidential information contained in the voter file or limiting the use of such
7 information, including four of the states from which Amici hail. *See* Appx. 1.⁴ Most
8 relevant here, California law explicitly establishes that “the California driver’s
9 license number, the California identification card number, [and] the social security
10 number, and . . . are confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person.” Cal.
11 Elec. Code § 2194(b)(1). Requiring disclosure of confidential information
12 contained in the voter file would thus violate not only voters’ privacy rights; it
13 could also violate state privacy laws.
14

15 In addition, forty-four states and the District of Columbia have either an
16 address confidentiality program (“ACP”) or a “Safe at Home” law that provides
17 additional confidentiality protections for certain groups of voters, such as victims of
18 domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and other crimes. *See, e.g., supra* note 4
19 (providing examples of protected groups); *see also* Minnesota Secretary of State,
20 *Other States with Programs Like Safe at Home*, <https://perma.cc/4YR5-HPMH> (last
21 visited Nov. 18, 2025) (listing states that have created ACPs or enacted Safe at
22 Home laws). These voter groups are at elevated risk of harassment, violence, and
23 other harms if the confidential information in their voter files is disclosed, and
24

25 ⁴ National Conference of State Legislatures, *Access to and Use of Voter*
26 *Registration Lists*, <https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists> (updated July 17, 2025); *see also* U.S. Election
27 Assistance Commission, *Availability of State Voter File and Confidential Information* (updated October 29, 2020), <https://perma.cc/45W2-XGJZ>.

1 states have a heightened interest in protecting their citizens from these harms by
2 keeping confidential voter information private.
3

4 Moreover, there is nothing in the NVRA or HAVA that supersedes—or even
5 conflicts with—these state confidentiality rules. The NVRA’s public disclosure
6 provision contains no mention of confidential information and no requirement that
7 such information be disclosed. *See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)* (public disclosure
8 provision of NVRA, which contains no mention of production of voters’
9 confidential information). To the contrary, several jurisdictions have expressly
10 recognized that states can refuse to turn over confidential information contained in
11 the voter file without running afoul of the NVRA. *See, e.g., Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows*, 92 F.4th 36, 56 (1st Cir. 2024) (“[N]othing in the text of the NVRA
12 prohibits the appropriate redaction of uniquely or highly sensitive personal
13 information in the Voter File.”); *see also True the Vote v. Hosemann*, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693, 736 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (“[T]he Public Disclosure Provision [of the NVRA] .
14 . . does not, as a general proposition, prohibit a State from protecting voter
15 registrants’ SSNs and birthdates as highly personal and sensitive information.”);
16 *Project Vote, Inc. v. Kemp*, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (NVRA
17 “does not require the disclosure of sensitive information that implicates special
18 privacy concerns.”).
19

20 Nor does HAVA conflict with state confidentiality rules. That statute does
21 not even contain a public disclosure requirement, let alone a requirement that state
22 agencies turn over confidential voter information to the federal government. *See*
23 *generally 52 U.S.C. § 21083* (no disclosure requirement). Thus, states can comply
24 with their obligations under the NVRA and HAVA without acceding to federal
25 demands for confidential information and indeed they must do so when state law
26 requires it.
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1 Similarly, states need not disclose confidential information about their voters
2 to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (“CRA”). The CRA allows the United
3 States Attorney General to request inspection of state voter rolls for the purpose of
4 investigating “alleged discriminatory practices.” *State ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers*, 187
5 F. Supp 848, 854 (M.D. Ala. 1960), *aff’d sub nom Dinkens v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.*,
6 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961); *see also* 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701, 20703 (retention and
7 inspection provisions of the CRA). But the federal government does not allege any
8 discriminatory practices here. And even assuming the Attorney General can request
9 inspection of voter rolls in these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that
10 states cannot comply with the CRA’s inspection provision while also protecting the
11 confidentiality of sensitive voter information. Nothing in the text of the CRA’s
12 records provisions preempts state privacy protections and preemption is not
13 implied. *See generally* 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20706 (no mention of preemption).
14 There is “a strong presumption against implied federal preemption of state law,”
15 which is strongest “in fields of traditional state regulation.” *ACA Connects - Am.’s*
16 *Commc’ns Ass’n v. Frey*, 471 F. Supp. 3d 318, 325 (D. Me. 2020) (citation
17 omitted). “Privacy regulation is just such a field.” *Id.*; *see also* *Bellville v. Town of*
18 *Northboro*, 375 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The states, of course, are free to
19 accord their citizens rights beyond those guaranteed by federal law.”). There is no
20 statutory or case law authority suggesting that a state cannot take appropriate steps
21 to protect confidential information about its residents while also complying with the
22 CRA.

23 Indeed, the CRA and voter confidentiality protections are not contradictory
24 and are properly read in harmony. The purpose of the CRA was to allow the
25 Attorney General to investigate the alleged disenfranchisement of voters based on
26 race. *Gallion*, 187 F. Supp at 854. It does not give federal officials an unfettered
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1 right of access to confidential information about voters in general. *In re Gordon*,
2 218 F. Supp. 826, 827 (S.D. Miss. 1963) (It is “a mistaken view to assume that [an]
3 investigation of [state voting] records is an unlimited discovery device which may
4 be employed and used without restraint”); *see also In re Coleman*, 208 F. Supp.
5 199, 201 (S.D. Miss. 1962) (recognizing exception to inspection right “when the
6 purpose is speculative, or from idle curiosity”), *aff’d sub nom. Coleman v. Kennedy*,
7 313 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1963). States can comply with the CRA while also
8 protecting confidential voter information as courts have repeatedly recognized in
9 other contexts. *See, e.g. Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc.*, 92 F.4th at 56 (allowing
10 redaction of sensitive personal information in voter file when complying with
11 disclosure requirements of NVRA). This principle applies in this context as well,
12 allowing states to comply with appropriate inspection requests by the Attorney
13 General while also redacting or withholding confidential information in the voter
14 file in accordance with state privacy rules.

15 **C. States have good reason to collect confidential information, but not share
16 that information with third parties including federal agencies.**

17 As described above, because states administer elections, state law governs
18 the circumstances and authorized officials who must collect voters’ confidential
19 information as part of the voter registration process. But it does not follow that just
20 because *states* possess voters’ confidential information, the federal government is
21 authorized to access it, nor that voters want that information shared with any other
22 third parties, including the federal government.

23 As the founders recognized, state governments are “best acquainted with the
24 situation of the people, subject to the control of the general government, in order to
25 enable it to produce uniformity and prevent its own dissolution.” *Gradwell*, 243
26 U.S. at 484 (quoting 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1784 p. 311 (Max

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1 Garrand ed. 1911)). And there are also practical concerns with states sharing and
2 the federal government aggregating sensitive voter information. There always is a
3 risk that electronically stored data could be hacked, breached, or stolen. But each
4 time data is shared, that risk necessarily increases, both during the transfer process
5 and because each custodian of records adds an additional target.

6 Here, the federal government’s efforts to create a national voter roll for the
7 first time therefore compound the risk of exposing private voter information.
8 Moreover, the federal government is an especially attractive target for hackers,
9 particularly for those working on behalf of nation-states. Federal agencies reported
10 over 30,000 security incidents in fiscal year 2022 alone. U.S. GOV’T
11 ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-24-107231, HIGH-RISK SERIES: URGENT ACTION
12 NEEDED TO ADDRESS CRITICAL CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION
13 1 (2024). The threat of such attacks is only growing. *See US warns that hackers*
14 *using F5 devices to target government networks*, Reuters (Oct. 15, 2025),
15 <https://perma.cc/E8E2-ZEGX>; *see also* Miranda Nazzaro, *Thousands of civil*
16 *servants’ passwords exposed since early 2024, report says*, FedScoop (Oct. 15,
17 2025), <https://fedscoop.com/thousands-of-civil-servants-passwords-exposed-since-early-2024-report-says/> (“A new report . . . is challenging the idea that federal
18 institutions are more secure than local governments against cybersecurity threats.”).
Indeed, just last month, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office was breached by
21 hackers. *US Congressional Budget Office hit by cybersecurity incident*, Reuters
22 (Nov. 7, 2025), <https://perma.cc/Y64D-JMQN/>.

23 In addition to federal targets being particularly sought after by hackers, the
24 Department of Homeland Security designates election infrastructure as “critical
25 infrastructure,” which “recognizes that the United States’ election infrastructure is
26 of such vital importance to the American way of life that its incapacitation or

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1 destruction would have a devastating effect on the country.” Cybersecurity and
2 Infrastructure Security Agency, *Election Security*, <https://perma.cc/U6MC-F3C3>
3 (last visited Nov. 18, 2025). In making that designation, DHS “cited cyberattacks
4 on American systems as potentially more sophisticated and dangerous than ever,
5 and elections as a primary target of cyber criminals.” White Paper delivered to
6 National Association of Secretaries of State, *Securing Elections Critical*
7 *Infrastructure* (2020), <https://perma.cc/48MC-C49D>; *see also* Brian E. Humphreys,
8 *The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure*, Congressional
9 Research Service (updated Sept. 18, 2019), [https://www.congress.gov/crs-
product/IF10677](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10677).

11 Unsurprisingly, even since that designation, critical infrastructure remains
12 squarely in the crosshairs of hackers. In 2024, roughly 70% of all cyberattacks
13 involved critical infrastructure. Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino, *Cyber Threat*
14 *Snapshot*, House Committee on Homeland Security, <https://perma.cc/R829-ZN25>
15 (last visited Nov. 18, 2025). That trend maps onto increased cyber attacks on election
16 systems globally. *Global Malicious Activity Targeting Elections Is Skyrocketing*,
17 Resecurity (Feb. 12, 2024), <https://perma.cc/KNV2-7EHP>. And concerns about the
18 security of American election infrastructure are even more pronounced now after the
19 federal government recently downsized and cut funding for the Cybersecurity and
20 Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which is tasked with protecting—among
21 other things—election infrastructure. *See* Lauren Feiner, *America’s cybersecurity*
22 *defenses are cracking*, The Verge (Nov. 10, 2025), <https://perma.cc/XR9D-ZCRT>.
23 Experts, including current Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes, are sounding
24 the alarm that changes during the current administration are further weakening the
25 country’s already strained cyber election protection apparatus. *Id.* As a result, by
26 trying to force multiple states to send their otherwise disparate sets of sensitive voter
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1 information all to the same repository at the DOJ, the federal government is only
2 making the bullseye brighter for bad actors, at a time when the federal government
3 is at the same time removing obstacles between hackers and their targets.

4 The concerns do not end there. The federal government has a long and
5 checkered history of infringing on individuals' privacy rights, including concerning
6 confidential voter information. In 2017, the Presidential Advisory Commission on
7 Election Integrity—similarly in pursuit of vague allegations of election
8 vulnerabilities and voter fraud—sent letters to state election officials across the
9 country seeking all publicly available voter roll data, including all registrants' full
10 first and last names, middle names or initials, addresses, dates of birth, political
11 party, last four digits of Social Security numbers if available, voter history from
12 2006 onward, information regarding any felony convictions, voter registration in
13 another state, and military status. Letter from Kris W. Kobach, Vice Chair, PACEI,
14 to Hon. Elaine Marshall, Secretary of State, North Carolina (June 28, 2017),
15 <https://perma.cc/J7TA-ALKV>. State officials—sometimes colorfully—expressed
16 grave concerns. Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes said there
17 was “not enough bourbon here in Kentucky to make this request seem sensible. . . .
18 Not on my watch are we going to be releasing sensitive information that relate to
19 the privacy of individuals.” Tom Loftus, Grimes: *‘Not enough bourbon’ in*
20 *Kentucky to make commission’s voter data request seem sensible*, Courier J. (last
21 updated July 1, 2017), <https://perma.cc/QF7G-MV8G>. She explained, “I’m not
22 going to risk sensitive information for 3.2 million Kentuckians getting in the wrong
23 hands, into the public domain and possibly for the wrong reasons, to keep people
24 away from the ballot box.” Pam Fessler, *Dozens Of States Resist Trump*
25 *Administration Voter Initiative*, NPR (last updated July 5, 2017),
26 <https://perma.cc/2AEE-AL4E>. Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann
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1 emphasized that states “conduct[] our own electoral processes,” and suggested “[the
2 Commission] can go jump in the Gulf of Mexico and Mississippi is a great State to
3 launch from.” *Id.*

4 The same concerns about sharing voters’ sensitive and confidential
5 information with the government apply with equal force now, as to states’
6 justifications for choosing not to do so. Indeed, in a recent letter to Attorney
7 General Pam Bondi and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, secretaries of
8 state from Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
9 Oregon, Vermont and Washington—all of which oversee elections in their states—
10 demanded answers on how private voter data was being used by the federal
11 government. Letter from Sec’ys of State to A.G. Bondi and Sec’y Noem (Nov. 18,
12 2025), <https://perma.cc/3U4N-PWXB>. The secretaries noted, among other
13 concerns, that their states’ voter registration lists include sensitive voter
14 information, including dates of birth, state driver’s license numbers, and the last
15 four digits of Social Security numbers. *Id.*

16 **D. The Federal Privacy Act prohibits DOJ’s conduct here.**

17 For precisely the sort of reasons described by the secretaries above, the
18 Privacy Act of 1974 places limits on a state’s ability to share sensitive information
19 with federal agencies. Congress passed the Privacy Act in response to the
20 Watergate and Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) scandals, which
21 exposed the dangers of unchecked government domestic surveillance and data
22 collection. The Privacy Act was designed to place “limits upon what the
23 Government can know about each of its citizens.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OVERVIEW
24 OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 at 1 (2020 ed.), <https://perma.cc/26QS-5WHE>.
25 Accordingly, the Privacy Act “sought to restore trust in government and to address
26 what at the time was seen as an existential threat to American democracy.” *Id.*

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1 To that end, the Privacy Act sought to prevent the federal government from
2 creating “formal or de facto national data banks” or “centralized Federal
3 information systems” that would consolidate sensitive personal data of Americans
4 stored at separate agencies. S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations and H.R. Comm. on
5 Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Privacy Act of
6 1974 – S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93-579), Source Book on Privacy at 168 (1976),
7 <https://perma.cc/DZ4J-Y2TE>. Congress established robust safeguards against such
8 “interagency computer data banks” to make it “legally impossible for the Federal
9 Government in the future to put together anything resembling a ‘1984’ personal
10 dossier on a citizen,” and to ensure “proper regard for individual privacy, the
11 confidentiality of data, and the security of the system.” *Id.* at 884, 217.

12 DOJ’s actions here contravene many of the Privacy Act’s requirements. First,
13 the Privacy Act forbids collecting or maintaining records “describing how any
14 individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly
15 authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or
16 unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.”
17 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).⁵ Here, DOJ’s letter to California explicitly requests “all
18 fields” from California’s electronic Voter Registration List. Letter from Harmeet K.
19 Dhillon to the Honorable Shirley N. Weber (Aug. 13, 2025), <https://perma.cc/8PYJ-FK5V>. By requesting all fields, DOJ is seeking, for example, each voter’s party
20 registration, which is one way in which an individual exercises rights guaranteed by
21 the First Amendment. *See Branti v. Finkel*, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (holding
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23 ⁵ Although § 552a(e)(7) includes an exception for collecting records
24 “pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity,”
25 nothing in DOJ’s complaint or letter to California identifies such a specific
26 “authorized law enforcement activity.” To the contrary, DOJ’s letter to California
27 makes clear the federal government is seeking “to assess the State’s compliance
with the statewide VRL maintenance provisions of the National Voter Registration
Act.” Letter from Harmeet K. Dhillon to the Honorable Shirley N. Weber (Aug. 13,
2025), <https://perma.cc/8PYJ-FK5V>.

1 political party affiliation is protected under the First Amendment). The request thus
2 violates the Privacy Act.

3 Second, the Privacy Act imposes procedural guardrails on what agencies
4 must do prior to establishing a “system of records,” defined as “a group of any
5 records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the
6 name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
7 particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). Any time the federal
8 government “maintain[s], collect[s], use[s], or disseminate[s]” such, records, it *must*
9 abide by notice-and-comment requirements and safeguards against data misuse, and
10 follow information-security mandates. *Id.* at § 552a(e)(1)–(12). Critically, when an
11 agency establishes or revises any system of records, it must “publish in the Federal
12 Register . . . a notice of the existence and character of the system of records,” *id.*
13 § 552a(e)(4), called a System of Records Notice (“SORN”). And at least thirty days
14 *prior* to such publication, an agency must publish a “notice of any new use or
15 intended use of the information in the system, and provide an opportunity for
16 interested persons to submit written data, views, or arguments to the agency.” *Id.*
17 § 552a(e)(11).

18 Issuance of a SORN is not mere window-dressing. SORNs “shall include”
19 nine categories of information. *Id.* § 552a(e)(4). These crucial details provide much
20 needed transparency about how the federal government is both protecting the
21 information in the system of records and how it intends to use the information. And
22 publishing a SORN is mandatory. Guidance issued contemporaneously with the
23 Privacy Act is unequivocal: “*In no circumstance* may an agency use a new or
24 significantly modified routine use as the basis for a disclosure fewer than 30 days
25 following *Federal Register* publication.” Off. of Mgmt. & Budget Circular No. A-
26 108, Federal Agency Responsibilities for Review, Reporting, and Publication under
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1 the Privacy Act at 7 (2016), <https://perma.cc/QZZ3-EB67> (emphases added).
2 Moreover, agencies “shall” not only solicit but also review any “public comments
3 on a published SORN” to “determine whether any changes to the SORN are
4 necessary.” *Id.* The “requirement for agencies to publish a SORN allows the
5 Federal Government to accomplish one of the basic objectives of the Privacy Act—
6 fostering agency accountability through public notice.” *Id.* at 5.

7 Here, DOJ has not published a SORN nor any other notice describing how it
8 intends to use the state voter roll data it is attempting to collect. Failure to issue
9 such a notice is, itself, a violation of the Privacy Act. This lack of transparency also
10 raises serious privacy concerns for California voters, who entrusted their personal
11 information to the state—not to the federal government. And this significant
12 privacy concern is not confined to California. The has publicly stated that it intends
13 to seek voter roll records from all fifty states. Matt Cohen & Zachary Roth, *DOJ Is*
14 *Said to Plan to Contact All 50 States on Voting Systems*, Democracy Dkt. (July 29,
15 2025), <https://perma.cc/H8HL-BGU>. Indeed, DOJ has already sued eight states
16 for declining to provide such data.⁶ These actions are consistent with DOJ’s broader
17 effort to build a “national voter roll.” Devlin Barrett & Nick Corasaniti, *Trump*
18 *Administration Quietly Seeks to Build National Voter Roll*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
19 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/09/us/politics/trump-voter-registration-data.html>. But doing so contravenes the Privacy Act’s prohibition on national data
20 banks and violates its transparency requirements. *See id.* (“The effort to essentially
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23 ⁶ *United States v. Bellows*, No. 1:25-cv-00468 (D. Me. Sept. 16, 2025);
24 *United States v. Oregon*, No. 6:25-cv-01666 (D. Or. Sept. 16, 2025); *United States*
25 *v. Weber*, No. 2:25-cv-09149 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025); *United States v. Benson*,
26 No. 1:25-cv-01148 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2025); *United States v. Simon*, No. 0:25-
27 cv-03761 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2025); *United States v. Board of Elections*, No. 1:25-
cv-01338 (D. N.D.N.Y Sept. 25, 2025); *United States v. Scanlan*, No. 1:25-cv-
00371 (D. N.H. Sept. 25, 2025); *United States v. Pennsylvania*, No. 2:25-cv-01481
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2025).

1 establish a national voting database, involving more than 30 states, has elicited
2 serious concerns among voting rights experts The initiative has proceeded . . .
3 seeking data about individual voters across the country, including names and
4 addresses, in a move that experts say may violate the law.”).

5 **III. CONCLUSION**

6 For the reasons stated above, Amici respectfully requests that the Court grant
7 Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

8 DATED: November 26, 2025 STOEL RIVES LLP

9 */s/ Matthew D. Segal*

10 JEREMY D. SACKS, CA Bar
11 No. 174839
12 jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
13 MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar
14 No. 190938
matthew.segal@stoel.com

15 *Attorneys for Amicus Curiae*

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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned, counsel of record for Amici Bipartisan Former State
Secretaries of State Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
certifies that this brief contains 6973 words, which:

complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

_____ complies with the page limit set by Section 6 under “Judge’s Procedures” on Judge Carter’s courtroom website,
<https://apps.cacd.uscourts.gov/Jps/honorable-david-o-carter>

DATED: November 26, 2025

/s/ Matthew D. Segal

JEREMY D. SACKS, CA Bar
No. 174839
jeremy.sacks@stoel.com
MATTHEW D. SEGAL, CA Bar
No. 190938
matthew.segal@stoel.com

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

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1 APPENDIX 1

2 **AMICI STATES' VOTER FILE AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
3 LAWS**

4 State	5 Information Contained in the Voter File	6 Information That Is Confidential or Use-Restricted Under State Law	7 Statute
8 Colorado	9 Full name, address, year of birth, political party, voting history, personal identifying information	10 Personal identifying information such as Social Security Number (SSN), Driver's License (DL) Number	11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-2-302 (8)
12 Connecticut	13 Not specified	14 SSN, DL Number	15 Conn. Gen. Stat. § <u>9-50d(b)</u>
16 Minnesota	17 Name, address, year of birth, voting history, phone number, voting district	18 DOB, SSN, DL number, ID number, military ID, passport number; additional use restrictions	19 Minn. Stat. § 201.091
20 Pennsylvania	21 Name, address, date of birth, voting history, voting district	22 Digitized or electronic signatures and the agency through which a voter is registered; information in voter file may not be used for commercial or improper purposes	23 <u>25 Pa. Cons. Stat.</u> <u>§§ 1207, 1325,</u> <u>1403</u>

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12 Plaintiff,
13 v.
14 SHIRLEY WEBER, in her official
15 capacity as Secretary of the State of
16 California and the STATE OF
17 CALIFORNIA,
18 Defendants.

Case No. 2:25-CV-09149-DOC-ADS

**[PROPOSED] ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMICI
CURIAE BRIEF OF
BIPARTISAN FORMER STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE**

19 On November 26, 2025, Bipartisan Former State Secretaries of State moved
20 for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. Because the Bipartisan Former State
21 Secretaries of State participation as amici would be useful to this Court, their
motion is hereby GRANTED.

22 SO ORDERED on this _____ day of _____, 2025.

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DAVID O. CARTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS BRIEF