1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
3	HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE PRESIDING		
4	JEFFREY POWERS, ET AL.,,)		
5))		
6	Plaintiffs,)		
7			
8	Vs.) No. LACV22-08357-FDOC		
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10	DENIS RICHARD MCDONOUGH,)		
11)		
12	Defendants.)		
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16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
17	Motion to Dismiss		
18	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA		
19	THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2023		
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23	MIRIAM V. BAIRD, CSR 11893, CCRA OFFICIAL U.S. DISTRICT COURT REPORTER		
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1 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2023; 0905 3 THE COURT: Thank you. If you would be seated. It's not necessary but very much appreciated. We're in 4 5 session in the matter of Jeffrey Powers, plaintiff, versus 09:08AM Denis Richard McDonough in his official capacity as the 6 7 Veterans Affairs secretary, case number 22-08357. 8 Counsel, I certainly know who you are. If you 9 would introduce yourself on behalf of plaintiffs and 10 defendants for just a moment, for my record. 09:08AM 11 MR. ROSENBAUM: Good morning, Your Honor. Mark Rosenbaum from public counsel on behalf of plaintiffs. 12 13 me are Roman Silberfeld and Tommy Du. There are also counsel 14 for the amicus. 15 If Your Honor please, there are a number of the 09:08AM 16 veterans who are here today, and I wonder if they could stand 17 and show themselves to you. 18 THE COURT: Certainly. Thank you. 19 MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 And could I have counsel for amicus introduce 09:08AM 21 themselves to you, too. MS. DANFORTH-SCOTT: Your Honor, Evelyn 22 23 Danforth-Scott for the Legal Scholars and the American Civil 2.4 Liberties Union. 25 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Would you state that again 09:09AM

	1	just because when you move away from that microphone, I don't
	2	need you to move to the lectern, but once again.
	3	MS. DANFORTH-SCOTT: Evelyn Danforth-Scott for
	4	amici Legal Scholars and the American Civil Liberties Union.
09:09AM	5	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
	6	MS. DANFORTH-SCOTT: Thank you.
	7	MR. PERKOWSKI: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter
	8	Perkowski for amicus Swords to Plowshares.
	9	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
09:09AM	10	MR. SILBERFELD: Roman Silberfeld, Your Honor.
	11	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And, counsel,
	12	then, please.
	13	MR. SMITH: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Keith
	14	Smith for defendant Douglas Guthrie in his capacity as the
09:09AM	15	president of the Housing Authority of the City of
	16	Los Angeles.
	17	THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
	18	MR. ROSENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Brad
	19	Rosenberg from the Department of Justice, Civil Division,
09:09AM	20	Federal Programs Branch on behalf of the federal defense.
	21	THE COURT: It's a pleasure. I think your
	22	colleague was elevated or demoted to the SEC?
	23	MR. ROSENBERG: I'd like to think demoted. As a
	24	result, I am here.
09:09AM	25	THE COURT: Well, it's good to have you here.

Counsel?

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MR. ROSENBERG: And with me at counsel table is Kristin Grotecloss from the Department of Veterans Affairs.

THE COURT: Pleasure. Let me start on a very positive note. I want to thank on the record all counsel in the amicus briefing. You really submitted to the Court some of the best research on both sides, an extraordinary issue, quite frankly.

The Court has taken quite a bit of time to look at this issue, and as you know, I changed my position on a couple positions I had at the initial tentative after looking.

I'm prepared to make this final but wanted to pay you a final courtesy for whatever record you'd like to make. I'm pretty far down the line on this decision, though. So it's not wasted, but it's a courtesy I wanted to extend. So I would invite the plaintiffs first and then respective defendants.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, we are pleased to submit on Your Honor's ruling. We express great appreciation for all the time and effort you and your clerks have put into this.

THE COURT: All right. Then, counsel, let me turn to the defense. I'm sorry. For the amicus, do you have anything further or the ACLU you'd like to state?

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1 MS. DANFORTH-SCOTT: No, Your Honor. Thank you for your attention. 3 MR. PERKOWSKI: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let me turn to 5 the respective defendants. 09:10AM MR. SMITH: Want to go first? 6 7 MR. ROSENBERG: Sure. 8 THE COURT: And then there will be a response to 9 whatever arguments. 09:11AM 10 MR. ROSENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Good morning, sir. 12 MR. ROSENBERG: Again, Brad Rosenberg from the 13 Department of Justice on behalf of federal defendants. Ι'd 14 like to start off by echoing what my friends on the plaintiffs' side have said. The government sincerely 15 09:11AM 16 appreciates the time and effort that the Court has put into 17 this case so far. 18 I'll note that we rather preferred the Court's 19 initial tentative decision in many respects to this one, and 2.0 we also appreciate that the Court, as just indicated, is 09:11AM 21 fairly far down the line in terms of its analysis. 2.2 But we would like to point out with the Court's 23 indulgence a few specific areas where we think the Court's analysis is candidly incorrect. Before I do that, I'd like 2.4 to take a step back. I am in a unique position in this case 25 09:12AM

because, as the Court knows, I'm taking the place of Mr. Avallone.

That brings advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage, of course, is I may be a little bit less familiar with the intricate details than my colleague is because he was enmeshed in this case in ways that I wasn't. But it also allows me to bring a fresh perspective to the case, and I think one area that really jumped out at me when I was preparing for this hearing is what is the ultimate relief the plaintiffs are seeking in this case, and what is the distinction that the parties have been drawing between benefits or accommodations or access to benefits.

This is an issue that the Court analyzed in its
Rehab Act analysis in both the initial tentative decision and
this tentative decision, and it's an issue that I actually
would like to thank our amici Swords to Plowshares for,
because at the end of the day the access to housing really is
all about the HUD-VASH program.

That is, of course, a housing program, but it's also a benefits program. In particular I'd like to draw attention to the Swords to Plowshares amicus brief on page 6, note 2, footnote 2. That's where the amici provide their analysis for HUD-VASH, and they say this is really a HUD program, but the Department of Veterans Affairs, they're involved but it's not really a VA program.

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They cite a statutory provision which is 42 USC 1437 Fo 19(d), and they say the VA at the end without providing any citation also provides case management services to the veteran. But generally this is a housing program.

So I went and looked at that statutory provision.

There have been a lot of statutory provisions that have been cited in this case. But it makes clear that --

THE COURT: Counsel, just a minute. Just a little slower. Look over at Miriam occasionally. If she has a scowl on her face, just slow down a little bit.

MR. ROSENBERG: I'll do my best.

That provision makes clear that an integral part of the HUD-VASH program that is at the core of the housing dispute in this case are the benefits that the Department of Veterans Affairs provides to HUD-VASH recipients.

The statute speaks of mandatory term. It says — that provide supportive housing assistance in conjunction with the Department of Veterans Affairs. Such programs shall provide rental assistance on behalf of homeless veterans who have chronic mental illnesses or chronic substance use disorders and shall require agreement of the veteran to continue treatment for such mental illness or substance use disorder as a condition of receipt of such rental assistance and shall ensure such treatment and appropriate case management for each veteran receiving such rental assistance.

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Those are wrap-around services, Your Honor. Those are VA benefits that are baked into the HUD-VASH program. So from the government's perspective, when we're looking at the VJRA channelling provision and how it relates to plaintiffs' request for accommodations for HUD-VASH benefits, those benefits are -- the HUD-VASH vouchers inherently involve veterans' benefits to the extent that the Department of Veterans Affairs is providing the social work and case work as well as the medical benefits for substance abuse disorders and mental illnesses.

So as a result, that's the hook that requires requests for HUD-VASH benefits to go through the VJRA channelling provision. With that, Your Honor, I would like to go through some of the specific points in the Court's tentative decision.

THE COURT: If you want to refer to the page at any time, I can put that up also.

MR. ROSENBERG: I would be happy to do so. Again, it's a rather long decision, but we appreciate the opportunity to review it in advance. I looked through it as quickly as possible, so I can't promise that I'll hit every point with which the government thinks the Court's analysis might be incorrect, but I'll at least try to hit the highlights.

I'd like to start on page 18. This actually really

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just goes to the point that I just made, which is, you know, toward the bottom the Court says: Importantly, permanent supportive housing that plaintiffs seek is not a benefit.

But again, the permanent supportive housing that's at issue in this case is HUD-VASH benefits. It doesn't matter whether they're tenant-based vouchers that are applied in the marketplace generally or project-based vouchers that might be provided for use in the west Los Angeles campus.

If it's a HUD-VASH voucher, it involves and has to involve some element of veterans' benefits that are of the type that normally gets challenged to the VJRA. So that analysis would apply, you know, across the Court's analysis on pages 18 and 19 of its decision.

Moving forward to page 20, there are two points.

The paragraph in the middle of the page where first the Court notes that: If the VA has not considered a question during a benefits hearing, it's not brought its expertise to bear.

It's important to remember the types of cases that plaintiffs and amici have cited where the VA's expertise has not been brought to bear are structural in nature such that the type of claim doesn't require the VA's expertise to be brought to bear.

So, for example, a lot of the cases that have been cited are torts cases. You know, one particular -- just one moment, Your Honor. You know, plaintiffs, for example, have

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cited I believe the Thomas versus Principi case and the Tunac case, which are both medical malpractice type claims.

Torts cases are different because the tort occurs. For example, in the Thomas versus Principi case, I believe a sponge was left inside someone after surgery. That tort occurs. It doesn't have anything to do with the benefits that the veteran receives. So once that tort occurs, you can bring a Federal Torts Claims Act case.

But also those cases noted in particularly the Tunac case that just as the VJRA carves out veterans' benefits cases from Court's Article III jurisdiction and channels them through this unique administrative, and then Article I Court review process, ultimately with Article III Court review, if necessary.

Congress specifically enacted the Department of Veterans Affairs Healthcare Professional Act of 1991, which in turn carved out torts cases from the VJRA. So you have a carveout of a carveout that makes all of those tort cases completely inapposite.

I would be concerned that the Court's analysis on page 20 not be interpreted to mean that a veteran can simply avoid having the VA opine on benefits decisions by not bringing them to the Department of Veterans Affairs in the first instance.

That's the administrative exhaustion requirement

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that we discussed in our briefs, and that exists and it's a fundamental principle of administrative law, and it's a principle that applies in the context of the VJRA.

The other point I'd like to respond to on page 20 concerns the sentence: Therefore, Article III Courts appear to be better equipped relative to VA and HUD to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims that the VA systematically discriminates against veterans based on their disabilities.

Whether or not that's true -- and I'm not going to speculate on whether that's true -- the reality is that Congress under the VJRA has carved out Rehabilitation Act claims among others from Article III jurisdiction. In fact, it did so in the context originally of the Rehabilitation Act itself.

So Congress has made that determination, and that determination should stand here. If at any point the Court wants me to stop or has any questions, I would be happy to answer any questions.

On page 22 of the Court's opinion, it cites the decision of Camacho versus Nicholson for the proposition that the Veterans Claims Court has explicitly recognized that it doesn't have jurisdiction to hear Rehabilitation Act claims.

That case is inapposite and inapplicable for a few different reasons. Number one, that case itself didn't really, as we read it, involve a Rehabilitation Act claim.

It instead involved speculation and dicta about whether or not the Rehab Act would apply to discrimination by the plaintiffs' employer, which happened to be the Department of Veterans Affairs. I don't believe that was a benefits case, or at least the Rehab Act analysis was not being applied in the context of benefits. It was being applied in the context of employment discrimination.

I believe the individual -- the Department of Veterans Affairs employed the individual as a driver and made a decision that his disability precluded him from being able to drive. That's not a benefits decision, Your Honor. That's just a straight-up Rehab Act claim.

What we have here with the HUD-VASH vouchers are benefits that are baked into the vouchers themselves. I would note that we have provided extensive citations in our briefs to the fact that veterans' Courts have in fact applied a Rehab Act analysis.

I have a couple of specific citations where -- you know, we cited those cases in our briefs in various places.

I won't repeat where we cited them, but, for example, there was a Board of Veterans Appeals decision number 1724432, where the board applied a Rehab Act analysis.

There was another case that we cite, Board of Veterans Affairs decision number 0533845 with the cite 2005 Westlaw 3924108, again applying a Rehab Act analysis.

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The third decision, 1998 Westlaw, 35201968 applying the Rehab Act analysis.

THE COURT: Each of those were contained in the briefing.

MR. ROSENBERG: Okay. They were. And we would argue that regardless of what one brief the Department of Veterans Affairs may have submitted years ago, regardless of what a few decisions may have said about the board's jurisdiction, the reality of the board's and subsequent Court's application of Rehab Act analysis to Rehab act claims brought in the context of benefits shows that in fact they do have jurisdiction and would have jurisdiction here.

Also, on page 22 the Court cites the VA handbook for a process or procedure by which individuals can bring Rehab Act claims and says that that process is mutually exclusive. We don't believe that that process set forth in the VA handbook is mutually exclusive.

Rehab Act violations can, of course, be brought independently of benefits claims and benefits determinations. So the fact that there exists a separate procedure to pursue those claims doesn't mean that those claims should not be pursued under the channelling provisions, again as reflected in the cases that we cited.

Finally, on the issue of relief, equitable relief, other forms of relief under the Rehab Act, the first question

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the Court needs to answer before it can get to the question of relief is whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first place. For the reasons we've set forth in our briefing, we don't believe that the Court does.

That's what I have in the Rehab Act issues that applies to VA, but there are a few other issues that the Court raised regarding HUD, claims against HUD, and, of course, the charitable trusts and --

THE COURT: The interplay between HUD and HACLA.

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. I don't know if the Court wants me to address those now or would like --

THE COURT: I do, because it will be a response and then a brief rebuttal.

MR. ROSENBERG: Okay.

So on the HUD, claims against HUD, either the Court for counts 1 and 3 on standing discusses the claims regarding insufficient funding, but I think as we've addressed in our briefing, there are no allegations that any of the individual plaintiffs in this case have been denied access to HUD-VASH vouchers, and we think that that controls.

For claim 2 the Court basically adopted the capable of repetition yet evading review analysis. We respectfully think that analysis is flawed. Under the Court's analysis any veteran with a disability would be able to bring a claim regardless of their current housing status because of the

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possibility that they might find themselves homeless again in the future.

Typically incapable of repetition yet evading review claims, the issue that gives rise to that type of claim is usually beyond the control of the individual plaintiffs. But here we would say there's at least an issue as to whether or not if somebody is being provided with the benefit, you know, that they want, if they find themselves no longer in a position to be able to take advantage of that benefit, is that necessarily due to actions of HUD or the federal government generally, or is that possibly due to the actions of the individual?

If the individual has control over their own actions in that context, then the government does not believe that the capable of repetition yet evading review analysis applies. We don't have a cite for that specifically, Your Honor, but we think that under logic, that would hold together.

Then on the merits for the claims against HUD, we would cite back to our VJRA arguments generally and the arguments that we've made in our brief.

Finally, regarding charitable trust claims, you know, the Court has adopted the position or seems to have adopted the position at least tentatively that the provisions in the West Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 generally mirror

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I may be summarizing a bit, but I think that's generally what the gist of what the Court is getting at in its analysis. Respectfully, we think that to impose trust obligations on the United States, that requires quite a bit more than that. As we've noted in our briefing, the leasing act does not mention the 1888 deed, does not accept any fiduciary duties arising from that deed, does not identify any beneficiaries who may sue to enforce.

It draws a distinction between the actions of the VA secretary, which it restricts, and the United States, which it does not. So that -- to the extent that there's a trust obligation, trust obligations I believe would run against the United States and not against a particular agency.

The act does not identify a private right of action, and there's no waiver of sovereign immunity. So in our prior briefing we made the argument that to the extent that these trust claims exist, they kind of collapse into plaintiffs' APA claims, and the APA contains the waiver of sovereign immunity against the United States.

Now, to be clear, we don't think the APA claims have merit, but that's, you know, a separate issue with which the Court appears to disagree. But there's no waiver of sovereign immunity for the trust claims generally. So to the

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1 extent that those claims overlap with the APA claims, if anything, they should just be brought pursuant to the APA 3 because waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed against the United States. And we don't think that there's 4 5 any showing that such a waiver exists here. 09:30AM Then finally, I don't want to the Court to think 6 7 that we believe there are valid claims that have been raised under the APA. We've addressed that in our briefing. Unless 8 9 the Court wants to hear from us on that, you know, we stand 09:30AM 10 by our prior briefing on the APA claims. We think that they 11 should be dismissed as well. 12 With that, unless the Court has any questions, 13 again, we appreciate the Court's time and effort in this. 14 understand that these are complicated and tricky issues, but we do think that the tentative decision that the Court has 15 09:30AM 16 graciously allowed us to review does make some legal 17 mistakes. 18 THE COURT: Counsel, thank you very much. 19 Counsel, let me turn to you now. 2.0 MR. SMITH: Good morning again, Your Honor. 09:31AM 21 THE COURT: Good morning. 2.2 MR. SMITH: Keith Smith for defendant HACLA. 23 I read through the tentative ruling, of course, 2.4 Your Honor. And starting at page 38 of Your Honor's detailed

ruling, it gets to the issue involving my client, which I

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submit -- I know in the initial tentative ruling that we had following the initial motion to dismiss, it did not address the issues that involved my client, but the current tentative ruling does.

In reading Your Honor's tentative ruling, it denies all of the arguments that we asserted on behalf of HACLA and ultimately reaches the conclusion that plaintiffs have stated viable claims against HACLA.

I certainly appreciate the analysis and work the Court did, but I very much disagree with that conclusion. I started out in our initial motion to dismiss and I think I've reiterated at every opportunity I've had to address the Court that HACLA simply doesn't belong in this case.

The overarching allegations and the gravamen of the complaint -- Your Honor, I have a copy of the complaint in front of me here.

THE COURT: Counsel, I think I almost have it memorized.

MR. SMITH: It's a couple hundred pages and lots of paragraphs.

THE COURT: By the way, when I was working with you on the first tentative, I refer back to the original complaint because I had originally stated or read that original complaint. So some of the paragraphs were incorrect on the record. You already had the first amended complaint,

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but I had started reading the original. So I apologize to both of you if those paragraphs were off.

MR. SMITH: Sure.

I would just submit, Your Honor, if you scour that complaint much like I have, and you have probably more than I have, there's very little information that pertains to my client HACLA. There's even less factual allegations against my client HACLA. I've tried repeatedly to distinguish how plaintiffs' attempt to lump in HACLA with the federal defendants.

If you look, Your Honor, at the very beginning of plaintiffs' complaint in this case, the operative first amended complaint, paragraph one with the introduction of their case, the last sentence of the very first paragraph of the complaint reads as follows: "The VA must do more and now to comply with its obligations under the law and to fulfill the promise we all make to those who serve in our military."

The remainder of the complaint continues down that theme where the premise of plaintiffs' complaint is that the federal government via the VA and via HUD is not doing enough for veterans. Then they make a couple of passing paragraphs referencing HACLA and then lump in HACLA with, quote, defendants throughout the remainder of the complaint.

What is glaringly absent from the complaint are factual allegations as to each individual plaintiff and how

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they had any interaction with HACLA, number one. And two, and most important for the three Rehab Act claims that are asserted against HACLA, how HACLA somehow discriminated against them solely because of their disability. The Court correctly identifies the Duval case setting forth that standard.

I submit to Your Honor that plaintiffs' allegations in the first amended complaint do not come anywhere clear near what Duval requires because they've not alleged any involvement with HACLA.

If you look, Your Honor, starting at page 19, paragraph 40, in the complaint from that page forward for multiple pages, the plaintiffs set forth the specific factual circumstances that pertain to each of the named individual plaintiffs.

What you will not find in those paragraphs is interactions that they allege they had with HACLA. What you will also not find is allegations in those paragraphs dealing with these specific plaintiffs are allegations that somehow HACLA denied them benefits and discriminated against them because of their disability.

Many of the plaintiffs don't even talk about seeking HUD-VASH vouchers, let alone seeking HUD-VASH vouchers through HACLA. If we look at the named complainant, Your Honor, the named plaintiff Mr. Powers, starting at page

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19, paragraph 40, and running through paragraph 49, he never even mentions HACLA once. He never mentions seeking HUD-VASH vouchers through HACLA, and he never mentions any allegations of how somehow HACLA discriminated against him.

What he talks about was that he first received benefits in Arizona. Then he moved to Palm Springs. Then he moved to Los Angeles. What he says in paragraph 49 of the complaint is, quote: Mr. Powers has now been approved for housing on the WLA grounds in one of the buildings that opened in May 2023.

I submit to Your Honor that if you dig through the actual facts that are pled, and even if Your Honor treats them as true for purposes of this motion, they're inadequate and they're insufficient. They're conclusory. They don't meet Twombly. They don't meet Igbal.

What you have, after having paragraphs and paragraphs of allegations, then in the actual charging allegations they put the bare bones skeletal elements and say defendants did this and defendants did that.

For example, paragraph 313, paragraph 314, and paragraph 318 that the Court cites in the tentative ruling as being some type of factual basis for liability, I submit to Your Honor if you read those paragraphs, it's just bare bones pleading, lumping all defendants together.

For example, if you look at paragraph 309, it says

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defendants administer the benefits offered by VAGLAHS and HUD-VASH in a manner that denies veterans the benefits of VAGLAHS services, programs, or activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.

Well, HACLA doesn't offer or provide benefits for the VAGLAHS. Then in paragraph 313 the plaintiffs allege: Defendants' denial of appropriate integrated services to plaintiffs is solely because of their disabilities, and plaintiffs are institutionalized or placed at risk of institutionalization because of defendants' discrimination.

I submit to Your Honor, where are the allegations that HACLA did something to each of these individual plaintiffs to discriminate against them solely because of their disability? I would submit, Your Honor, none of that is in this complaint, and none of it can pass this motion to dismiss submitted by HACLA because of that.

In Your Honor's tentative ruling, it indicates that plaintiffs have standing to sue and indicates that the bar of standing is not high, citing the Maya versus Centex Corp. case which I'm familiar with because I was counsel in that case representing home builders.

The plaintiffs in that case alleged a particularized injury that their home values dropped because of the practices of home builders selling to uncreditworthy buyers, and they alleged that each of these builders sold

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homes and did that. The Ninth Circuit found that sufficient to constitute standing.

Here we have a far cry from that in the allegations in front of Your Honor because there's nothing here that alleges anything that HACLA did. What is actually at play here is plaintiffs' challenge to the federal regulations involving HUD-VASH.

HACLA does not set the standards for HUD-VASH.

HACLA has to follow those standards and follow federal law.

As much as plaintiffs don't like those standards and don't like those regulations and want to challenge them, the vehicle to challenge them is not through HACLA. HACLA is a local PHA who has a mandatory obligation to follow those regulations.

In contrast to discriminating against these veterans, what the record in front of Your Honor demonstrates is that actually HACLA had been championing the benefits for these veterans, and HACLA had been seeking to obtain the most amount possible, asking for exceptions to these regulations to try and get more benefits for the veterans, even though HACLA has no standard and certainly no mandatory duty imposed on a public entity to do that.

HACLA's obligations are to follow these regulations, which they have done. Plaintiffs just don't like the regulations because of the impact of them.

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I think Your Honor's footnote in footnote 18 is directly on point on this issue about how perverse some of these regulations impact one person who has a disability rating and someone who doesn't. But if the factual assertion that Your Honor sets forth in footnote 18 applies, how is that fairly traceable to any conduct by HACLA?

HACLA would just implement that policy based on the regulations that plaintiffs challenge, but that does not mean and can never mean that HACLA somehow discriminated against that veteran who had a disability rating. That's what's at issue in this case.

That's why I submit to Your Honor that I would concur with the arguments we made previously on standing. I would concur with the federal government's arguments regarding the application of the VJRA.

I would also submit, Your Honor, as we put in our briefing, the cases of Lee versus Modlin and the case Smart versus Department of V.A. Those were both federal cases involving HUD-VASH benefits, the exact benefits we're dealing with in this case, and in both of those cases the federal Court determined they lacked jurisdiction to deal with HUD-VASH benefits.

In the Lee versus Modlin case, the plaintiff challenged being discharged from the HUD-VASH program. And in Smart, the plaintiff challenged the determination of

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whether he met the definition of, quote, homeless, under HUD-VASH. In both of those cases the Court determined it lacked jurisdiction because of section 511 and the VJRA.

So I would echo the federal government's arguments on that issue. But I think in this case and how I've asserted this morning and repeatedly, HACLA is in a different position than the federal government is here. There is no claim. The plaintiffs lack standing. They can't allege anything that is fairly traceable to any conduct of HACLA.

The last point I want to make, Your Honor, in supporting that is by looking at the relief. The relief that the plaintiffs seek in this case, Your Honor, is not relief directed at HACLA. The relief being sought in this case is directed at the federal defendants.

They want in paragraph 351(b) to declare the federal government's acceptance of the land transferred under the deed of trust. They want to declare that the defendants breached and continue to breach their fiduciary duties as trustees of the charitable trust.

They want to enjoin the defendants from failing to provide plaintiffs and veterans with SMI and TBI appropriate permanent supportive housing. That has wrap-around services, the mental care, the mental health care. HACLA doesn't provide any of that information.

So even if the Court were to find that it has

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1 jurisdiction, even if the Court was to find somehow there is standing, and even if the Court was to find somehow 3 plaintiffs have stated a claim, they can't seek the relief 4 they're looking for from HACLA anyways. So, Your Honor, I appreciate the time and I would 09:45AM just respectfully urge the Court to reconsider its ruling as 6 7 it pertains to HACLA because I strongly believe based on the 8 facts, based on the information that has been submitted, 9 HACLA does not belong in this case. 09:45AM 10 We've submitted a declaration from representatives 11 of HACLA indicating they had no involvement with multiple of 12 these plaintiffs. That's never been challenged by the 13 plaintiffs here. Their complaints don't challenge that. If someone has never interacted with a party, how 14 15 can they possibly allege they were discriminated against 09:45AM 16 solely based on their disability? 17 Thank you for your time, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Counsel, thank you very much. 19 Counsel, your response, please. Go to the lectern 2.0 just so I'm certain we can hear you, because there's a 09:46AM 21 distance between the microphone. 2.2 And, counsel, I certainly know who each of you are, 23 but just for the record would you reidentify yourself by name 2.4 and who you represent. 25 MR. PERKOWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. 09:46AM Peter

Perkowski for amicus Swords to Plowshares.

THE COURT: Pleasure.

MR. PERKOWSKI: I'd like to respond to some of the comments about the Rehab Act only, which is what we addressed in our brief. The first point that counsel made had to do with the statute that regulates and governs HUD-VASH.

The involvement of VA in this program does not turn it into a VA benefit. Your Honor quoted the regulations that defined both the claim and a benefit. Neither apply to this program because it's not administered by the VA. It's not in Title 38. It's in Title 42.

The VA's sole role in that is to determine eligibility. In essence, a homeless veteran shows up and seeks to qualify for benefits, and the VA determines whether they are entitled or not. And if a veteran is experiencing houselessness, the VA will send them to HUD for the HUD-VASH program. So, not administered by the VA.

Yes, I understand there are wrap-around services, and those services are administered by VA, but they're not -- those services aren't being sought in this case. Those have already been adjudicated.

The second point that counsel made had to do with precedent. Both defendants referenced cases in the brief, and I just want to give Your Honor a suggestion about how these cases split up in a way that makes sense for both this

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statute and this case. And the -- it's helpful to think about whether these cases or claims are individualized or systemic or systemwide, and whether they are adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory. And by adjudicatory, I mean the process and determination of a benefit.

So that gives us four types of cases. The first is individualized adjudicatory claims, and those types of claims are the cases that defendants cite in page 8 of the federal defendants' supplemental brief where the Board of Veterans Appeals did consider Rehab Act claims, but it was when the plaintiff was saying your VA's denial of a benefit violated the Rehab Act claim. That's completely different from the claims in this case.

In fact, when those same veterans, same types of veterans go to federal court and say VA's denial of my claim for a benefit violated the Rehab Act, they were tossed out, appropriately. That's in footnote 2 of the federal defendants' brief. So individualized adjudicatory belong in the VA benefits claim system.

Individualized non-adjudicatory, an example would be physical access to a building. Right. Those claims do not belong in the VA claims adjudicatory system. There's a separate system that is set out in the VA handbook. Anyone can use it and say: I can't access. This violates the Rehab Act, and the VA can respond under that handbook.

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1 I would submit that this case is similar to that process because -- although the barrier here is not a 3 physical barrier. It's the lack of accommodation that's the 4 barrier, and those types of claims, individualized 5 non-adjudicatory, belong in federal courts. 09:50AM Systemic adjudicatory claims are similar to VCS 6 7 which the parties cite here repeatedly. Then you have 8 systemwide non-adjudicatory policies and practices, and 9 that's this case because the plaintiffs here are not seeking 09:50AM 10 HUD vouchers. 11 HUD vouchers are not geographically targeted to VA 12 They're about the general rental market, and the campuses. 13 plaintiffs here are not saying that we need those vouchers so 14 we can go get housing. They're saying that they need housing 15 near their healthcare providers. Right. 09:50AM 16 That's a distinct issue from eligibility for the 17 voucher at all. The Court may ultimately decide that 18 plaintiffs are not entitled to that relief or that accommodation, but that's a merits question, not a reason to 19 2.0 dismiss the claims. 09:51AM 21 I think I've made my point. 2.2 Thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Counsel, thank you. 2.4 MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, Mark Rosenbaum on

behalf of plaintiffs. I just want to underscore those last

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1 If anything, the government's argument reinforces points. Your Honor's ruling, particularly at pages 18 and 19. 3 THE COURT: Would you move just a little closer to 4 the microphone. 5 MR. ROSENBAUM: Of course. 09:51AM THE COURT: Thank you. I'm sorry. 6 7 MR. ROSENBAUM: It reinforces Your Honor's decision 8 particularly at pages 18 and 19 of the ruling. That's not 9 the relief that's involved. It reinforces the fact that this 09:51AM 10 is not a VA decision making. That is the essence of what the 11 jurisdiction stripping statute is about. 12 As the ACLU brief pointed out, 13 jurisdiction-stripping statutes are serious business. 14 Presumptions are against them going all the way back to 1803 and Marbury. This is serious business when an Article III 15 09:52AM 16 Court and an Article I Court cannot pass on the decision 17 making and the policies of the executive branch and the 18 legislative branch. 19 Nothing here upsets the arguments that we made, 2.0 that the amicus made, and that Your Honor presented there. 09:52AM 21 No benefits decision administered by the VA regarding these 2.2 plaintiffs is involved in this case. That is precisely what the VCS case at 1034 talked about. It's what the Browdy case 23 2.4 talked about. It's what the FTCA cases talked about. Nothing here even dents that decision. 25 09:52AM

We are pleased to submit on Your Honor's ruling.

THE COURT: All right. Then briefly, counsel.

Brief rebuttal, a couple minutes from either side.

MR. ROSENBERG: Once again, Your Honor, Brad
Rosenberg from the justice department on behalf of federal
defendants.

I will be brief. It is critical to recognize that the HUD-VASH vouchers do have elements of VA healthcare benefits within them. My friend from Swords to Plowshares tried to draw a distinction and say, well, that voucher program is under the United States Code Section for HUD and not for VA.

That's an artificial distinction, Your Honor, because it is still VA that under United States law is required to provide benefits. The test that they propose is artificially narrow. It's not just -- the VJRA jurisdictional provisions do not just involve benefits, but as the D.C. Circuit noted in the Blue Water decision -- and I know this was discussed at great length by my colleague at the last hearing -- it's not just decisions about benefits themselves but also -- and I'm going to quote -- questions about whether VA's decisions -- let me quote this exactly. Excuse me, Your Honor. The VJRA, quote, extends not only to cases where adjudicating veterans' benefits requires the District Court to determine whether the VA -- I knew I was

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too fast. I'll start over.

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The VJRA, quote, extends not only to cases where adjudicating veterans' claims requires the District Court to determine whether the VA acted properly in handling a veteran's request for benefits but also to those decisions that may affect such cases.

This whole lawsuit is about homeless veterans who have disabilities. They want access to care from VA, and the root of that access, the HUD-VASH program, provides some of those very VA benefits that plaintiffs seek.

It provides mental health care. It provides social services. It provides substance-abuse care. Those are VA benefits. Regardless of what section of the United States Code they fall under, those are VA benefits.

This is where the Court got it right in its initial tentative decision, noting that allowing these claims to proceed will embroil District Courts in analyzing how do those supportive services through the HUD-VASH program relate to the other benefits that the veterans are receiving. They're all tied together and they're tangled together, and it's very difficult to untangle them.

So one other case that I wanted to discuss which I think hasn't been discussed very much, I believe, at the last hearing, but my colleague from HACLA reminded me about the significance of this case in the context of HUD-VASH. That's

1 that the Bluestein versus HUD case out of the District of New Hampshire. The cite is 2013 Westlaw, 6627 --3 THE COURT: I'm familiar with it, counsel. MR. ROSENBERG: -- 965. Yep. And as the Court is 4 5 aware, in that case the Court dismissed claims brought 09:56AM 6 against HUD challenging the denial of HUD-VASH benefits due 7 to lack of jurisdiction under the VJRA. 8 That case I believe cited another case, as I 9 recall. It might be out of Texas. I can't recall for sure. 09:56AM 10 But once again we have provided cases that really have not 11 been addressed by plaintiffs' counsel or the amici, in any 12 meaningful way at least, that discuss how the VJRA 13 channelling provisions include HUD-VASH benefits, the benefits that the VA provides, because they're all integrated 14 15 together. 09:57AM 16 With that, unless the Court has any further 17 questions, you know, we would urge the Court to reconsider 18 its tentative decision. We do think that all claims in this 19 case should be dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction or 2.0 for failure to state a claim. 09:57AM 21 THE COURT: Counsel on behalf of HACLA, briefly, 22 please. 23 MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 2.4 Your Honor, Keith Smith on behalf of defendant 25 HACLA again. Thank you for the opportunity. 09:57AM

I would say in summarizing our position and setting forth why I think some of the Court's analysis in the tentative ruling is correct is looking at page 25 of the tentative ruling.

In page 25 of Your Honor's tentative ruling,

Your Honor indicates that it agrees with HUD that Mr. Sessom

lacks standing. The Court goes on to say the Court agrees

Mr. Sessom is eligible for a HUD-VASH voucher, but he, quote,

has not been able to find a landlord who is both willing to

accept a VASH voucher and close enough, end quote, to walk to

the WLA grounds.

The Court goes on to indicate that Mr. Sessom's injury is traceable to private landlords, not HUD. It also indicates that Mr. Sessom was denied housing on the WLA grounds because his income was too high.

I would submit, Your Honor, the exact same analysis applies to HACLA for not only Mr. Sessom but every single plaintiff in this case. Their primary argument is they're not getting enough money to live somewhere near the West L.A. grounds to receive the wrap-around care. But that is not determinative at all by HACLA.

HACLA does not determine the funding amount for each of these veterans. HACLA does not determine whether you can find a landlord who is willing to accept a VASH voucher close enough to the West L.A. grounds. That applies -- the

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1 analysis the Court applied to Mr. Sessom in its tentative ruling I would submit, Your Honor, applies to every single 3 one of the plaintiffs in this case as it applies to HACLA 4 because none of their claims are fairly traceable to any 5 conduct by HACLA. 10:00AM I would submit on that, Your Honor. Thank you. 6 7 THE COURT: Counsel, thank you. 8 Counsel? 9 MR. ROSENBAUM: No, Your Honor. 10:00AM 10 THE COURT: All right. If you cited a case that 11 you did not include in your briefing in the argument today, I 12 don't recall such a case. Every case that has been cited by 13 the parties has been read and considered by the Court. I'm not going to belabor this. I want to thank all 14 15 of you, especially with your patience with the Court because 10:00AM 16 the Court took about an extra three weeks in the analysis of 17 this to be certain that this is the right decision. And for 18 the purposes of the motion to dismiss, this is the correct 19 decision. 2.0 Karlen, do you have a pen? 10:00AM 21 And with a little bit of humbleness, I have 22 forgotten the date, counsel. The days are blurring together 23 for me. What's the date? The 14th. My apologies. Thank 2.4 you. All right.

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This is the final order of the Court denying

defendants' motions to dismiss this matter. This will be docketed immediately. I prepared extra copies, of course, for each of you, I think 14 or 15 copies, which can be distributed now.

Instead of taking a recess and coming back, I'm not quite certain what to expect in the future from each of you. There's been reference to you bringing the Court injunctive relief in an affirmative nature. There's been reference to the interplay between HACLA and HUD. And frankly, each of you in a sense have pointed the finger at HUD and HACLA back and forth to each other. It has to be an uncomfortable position.

Also, after this opinion was rendered, we received notification -- could you help me with that letter that came in from a congressman?

Apparently Congress is starting to take note.

Could you put it up on the screen. I want to represent to you and put on the record that when the Court had made its decision, it actually -- I actually made the decision about three weeks ago when I put out notice to you and scheduled a hearing today, because I wanted, if I didn't change my mind, for you each to perfect your record as a courtesy.

This came into my possession I think two days ago.

It is a Congressperson's efforts in this very area that I'm literally going to attach not as a part of this ruling but as

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a separate document. Once again I represent to you this had no bearing on the Court's decision. I represent to you that three weeks ago I made the decision. I think we finished off the 12th or 13th draft last night sometime. So if there's a knit, it's entirely my responsibility because -- I don't think there are.

Help me. We're going to scroll down. You know that the secretary of Veterans Affairs is not required, only requested. So if you bring affirmative relief, the next issue is for me to decide what that looks like.

A large part of that would depend upon when we set the trial date. So therefore, in this opinion I ordered a meet and confer by January 4th. Certainly if our troops are on the front line, we can work a little bit through the holidays, just as they are.

There's another route open to you, and that's in terms of settlement. When you first came into my court, you had said: Judge, we made a good-faith mistake. We had this settled for X number of units. There was no follow-through or little follow-through by the government.

That had the implication of if there would have been a consent decree or some judicial muscle in a sense behind this, there might have been satisfaction. From your perspective, I tried to note that the VA has picked up their pace recently.

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Also, the machinations of going through the EPA and those different agencies I tried to be gentle by passing. I could have used finger pointing. I didn't know what to say, but the interplay between the government agencies causes some concern from all of our standpoint. It makes all of us uncomfortable.

"Dear Mr. Secretary: I write to urge you to address the issue of veteran disability compensation being considered as income for the purposes of Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD, and the Department of the Treasury housing and financing programs of the upcoming United States Interagency Council on Homelessness council meeting scheduled for March 13, 2023.

"I applaud the efforts of you and the Department of Veterans Affairs, the VA, have made to address the veterans' homelessness, and I believe addressing the disability compensation issue will assist these ongoing efforts.

"The development of HUD-VASH project-based permanent supportive housing, PSH, is critical to VA's progress to end and prevent veteran homelessness. PSH capital funding opportunities often reward applications that earmark units for extremely low or low-income tenants.

"While this practice benefits people who are homeless and generating no or limited income who might apply to these units, it serves to limit access to quality,

subsidized housing for high-needs, service-connected veterans.

"Veterans who are homeless are often on the street and not as a result of extremely limited income but severe trauma directly related to their military service. It is the resulting disabilities that qualify veterans for service connection and veteran disability compensation.

"These homeless service-connected veterans are the very people for whom HUD-VASH project-based permanent supportive housing is built -- so that these veterans with acute needs have their care integrated directly in and with their housing.

"A unique aspect of the project-based voucher program under HUD-VASH is the ability to project-based HUD-VASH units on the grounds of a medical facility, which is prohibited under the traditional project-based voucher program but allows VA and HUD to co-locate housing and services for veterans.

"PHAs may partner with their local VA medical center to utilize the VA Enhanced-Use Lease Program, EUL, program to out-lease underutilized real estate under its jurisdiction or control to the private sector for the purpose of developing supportive housing for homeless veterans and their families, including HUD-VASH participants.

"Through this program veterans are provided with an

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expanded range of services that would not otherwise be

available on medical center campuses. However, given the

structure of the capital funding, this target population is

often rendered ineligible. Funders of projects award funds

to developers to build PSH, and they often set income caps as

a condition of the award frequently between 30 percent to

for percent of the area median income, AMI.

"HUD sets the definition of AMI and those sources

"HUD sets the definition of AMI and those sources of income that are used to calculate AMI, which currently includes veteran disability compensation, with the exception of deferred VA disability benefits and aid and attendance."

Now, let me stop. This is my own interjection. It took me quite a while digging into this record, and that's why I used the simple example, or tried to, in a footnote after writing a page and a half in this area.

"The annual income derived from VA disability benefits for a single veteran with no dependents and a hundred percent service connection rating is \$43,463.40."

And, of course, lesser if you're 40 percent disabled, 50 percent, et cetera.

"We have heard accounts of disabled veterans seeking housing in the newly constructed buildings on the West Los Angeles VA Medical Center campus being turned away due to ineligibility because their income puts them over the AMI caps for a unit. Extremely low income or 30 percent of

the AMI for a one-person family in the Los Angeles metro area is \$25,050. Very low income or 50 percent of the AMI is \$41,700. Unfortunately the issue of VA disability compensation exceeding AMI limits is not limited to Los Angeles.

"My staff frequently hears from other communities that homeless veterans are being rendered ineligible for permanent supportive housing on and off VA campuses due to their disability benefits. In its recent rule making for the Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of 2016" -- and I'll skip the acronym for a moment -- "HUD solicited comments from the public as to whether exclusion of veteran disability compensation from AMI eligibility calculations was advisable.

"In the final rule HUD elected not to exclude veteran disability compensation from AMI calculations. While I am disappointed in HUD's decisions, I also understand that this issue is not limited to HUD. Treasury's Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program also uses HUD income definitions for prospective tenants in buildings financed with LIHTC even though Treasury's own Internal Revenue Service does not treat veteran disability benefit payments as income.

"My understanding is that both HUD and Treasury have been aware of this issue for years, but neither agency has taken the necessary steps to rectify their definitions of income to exclude veteran disability compensation. I

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encourage you to convene a discussion between the VA, HUD, and Treasury to finally address this critical issue at the upcoming USICH council meeting and to develop a solution to ensure that homeless veterans for whom permanent supportive housing is built can access it.

"Mark Takano, Ranking Member of the House."

I think I received this two years ago. I received your amicus. So the public is welcome to comment.

Wherever you're going with this, with affirmative injunctive relief as to the Court in the future, or setting a trial date depending upon what my decision is, or settlement discussions, somehow I would encourage you to get Congress involved, because whatever decision this Court makes will perhaps be beneficial, but eventually Congress is going to have to really take a look at this area. And here apparently we have a congressional representative who is taking a leadership position.

The second thing is it points out what I gently tried to point out, which is the contradictory positions in my court right now between HUD and HACLA in a sense of responsibility. But we have these contradictory positions also within government, if you will.

I noted in the briefing, for instance, that part of the delay was caused just by the EPA qualifications that these programs didn't get off the ground. I neglected and

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want to put in the record also that as you've come to the forefront now and tried to push this process as quickly as possible, from your perspective the EPA, the government in a sense, another agency, was holding back for a number of years that put you in a detrimental position.

When the plaintiffs argue you've only been able to complete X amount, your response should be it took us two years just to get the permits to get through this. Okay? So there's a lot of finger pointing that can take place, but, you know, better together somehow.

So I'm just encouraging you to start reaching out. That's why I extended the humble invitation to the secretary of VA, because he's got to lead this. He's got to call this to the administration.

And the Court can make rulings, et cetera, which will be in a litigation posture, but you also have an opportunity here, I think, to use maybe this lawsuit between the two of you to reach some resolution here especially in this VASH-HUD, because your most severely disabled veterans are in fact being excluded.

A second issue is this whole facility, this 4,000 units out of West Los Angeles -- could you put up the picture of the chapel for just a moment. You know that I was involved before your lawsuit came to my court in terms of homelessness, and you know that we were down on Skid Row. I

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represent to you that I invited Steve Peck to come down.

He's one of your veterans developers out there. I've known him in the Marine Corps a long time since.

Frankly I'd state to you if you had him involved,
I'd trust whatever input he is giving you in this matter.

Could you put that up for a moment. Okay. This is the chapel. When you drive in, if you drive down Wilshire -- remember, I'm a UCLA Bruin historically. That's why we pray for miracles in football. Just kidding you.

But I've been familiar with this campus since the 1960s. We all know that it had 4,000 veterans there. It dissipated down to almost zero for whatever reason. I wrote about the -- with no denigration to the West Los Angeles Homeowners Association being opposed to veterans being here. It's hard to explain how a facility goes from 4,000 to zero. Nobody could justify that.

I know that there is a push on the plaintiffs' part, hey, look, Judge, if we bring injunctive relief, we've got disabled veterans that we certainly want to get into this housing as quickly as possible. We also want housing generally for homeless veterans regardless because eventually they're going to need services. And why not this campus? I know -- and I don't think it was facetiously, but you also asked me to find fiduciary duty for you. Remember?

Well, I really didn't want to do that, but I might

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say, you know, quit leasing land of this type and, you know, without going any further.

MR. ROSENBERG: That was in our briefing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, it was in your briefing, and I started to get facetious. You know, we know what not to do in my briefing, and I tried to lay that out as gently as possible.

What's happening here? Look at this picture. Now we've got the West Los Angeles homeowners apparently upset with Vietnam veterans back in the 1970s and 1980s. Then it falls into disuse and disrepair.

If you want to contain your veterans -- veterans talk to each other, by the way. They talk about their combat experiences. They don't go out to the outside world.

They've got a network out there that's both therapeutic and healthy.

If you want to keep them out of your neighborhood, folks, why don't you get this chapel up and running in an interdenominational sense. Otherwise your veterans should be going out to different churches, because veterans believe in something when they're in combat. Trust me. Now, they may go back on their word, but veterans will buy off more in terms of God or something when they're in combat. And they need this.

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1 So not getting religion involved, look at this chapel. For God's sake, it's historic. Why isn't -- I bet 3 you if we drove out there right now, because you've got some 4 units open, we could find ten veterans who would paint this 5 in no time, if they had the paint, and get it up and 10:18AM 6 operating. Yet I know the government will come back and say 7 we've got EPA problems, you know. We've got X structural. 8 We can get this up and running while your lawsuit is pending and do some very positive things just in 9 terms of worship on the ground so they don't go out in the 10:18AM 10 11 community. This is something that the VA could take a 12 leadership position. 13 No. No. I'm on a roll now. Give me a chance. 14 was polite with you, okay? These are just suggestions because --15 10:18AM 16 MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, I've been in that 17 chapel, and --18 THE COURT: No. No. Thank you very much, counsel. I don't care what you do. I'm tossing things out 19 2.0 without comment. Now, I've been polite. I've listened to 10:18AM 21 you. Now you're listening to me. You're done, okay? 22 So you can go the litigation route, but if you do, 23 I want this case set quickly -- June at the latest. Well, maybe July or August at the latest, depending upon your 2.4 schedule. This case is not going to languish anymore. 25 10:18AM

Now, we've got summary judgment motions coming up, another chance to review all of this again. This is a motion to dismiss.

Two, you can get involved in settlement discussions. But if you do, that doesn't delay litigation. What I won't hear again is the five times you two were discussing settlement and it turned out that you were just talking to each other.

Number three, I don't care if McDonough or whoever appears here, but I do care that this is at the highest levels of government, for goodness sake, because you as litigants cannot drive this ship. You can only, you know, call to attention the different acts and what they stand for.

Congress needs to get involved and resolve this, because somehow from your standpoint you're counting the most disabled having the greatest detriment. So if you're a hundred percent disabled or 50 percent disabled, we count that against you, and therefore you're not going to get housing. You're not going to get services. It's absolutely backwards, at least for the reasoning that has been purported.

This isn't my focus. You drive through that campus and I see the buildings, and I know you're building.

Compliments. Have you seen the number of abandoned buildings out there? Have you really? Have you, counsel?

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1 MR. SMITH: I have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I almost held a hearing out there but didn't want to take away, you know, from the formality now. But if you drove out there, you would be astounded at the number of buildings, and yet we're building new buildings instead of rehabbing them. Maybe that's development. I don't know, but we have got vacant space out there that is absolutely incredible.

So it goes to your point. Hey, get your disabled veterans in first, you know, who need services immediately. But what about the other veterans? Why isn't this a home, a campus again for up to 4,000 or 3,000 people? Now, I know the community is going to push back.

My compliments. First of all, thank him. I thank him for coming out. But if he came out to dedicate 53 units, maybe he ought to be out here involved in the settlement discussions if you get that far when we're talking about 4,000 units. I'm looking for that leadership coming from the veterans of the secretary or from this administration, because I don't think you as counsel can resolve that other than litigating and clashing heads. Okay?

I think that this is subject to settlement, quite frankly. I'm not going to order a mandatory settlement. I'm going to see what your position is when you talk informally. I'd like to try to go that route. It's quicker. But this

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time you do need a consent decree. You do need accountability. You do need something behind you to make certain that this takes place.

Now, a couple other things. You may be building at the fastest pace you can right now. Let's just say we had 4,000 veterans in the Los Angeles area -- about 3,000. You've tripled since 2015. You've gone up 600 just since the lawsuit was filed.

I know you offered 200 additional spaces, but I put in that's only 25 per year for six or seven more years. It's inadequate. You need flexibility involved in this. You need some process for dispute resolution, which we're going to have in another case a little while later on where the Court is going to work with you and you can work with the Court in terms of some flexibility for the benefit of the veterans.

So what I'm afraid of is the adversarial process will bring a solution now in June or July or August, but it won't give you the long-term flexibility unless the Court fashions, you know, injunctive relief now or remedial relief later on. That's all on the table. I haven't gone down that road.

There's so much else I'd like to say to you, but better together than apart on this. I genuinely think all of us want the same thing, and we want it as quickly as possible. So if you're going to bring me injunctive relief,

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I'm going to give you a tip. How do we order 4,000 units
right now when we're competing with limiting space for UCLA
students trying to get on Mayfair and some of these other
locations, this limited space, without driving up the rent?

Number two, how do we know that we can find 4,000
veterans who want to go in? A lot of the veterans aren't
going in. They're used to living under the stars. But a lot

of them are, and they're being excluded right now.

So I think that, number one, you can get your disabled in right now who is willing to go and who need services, I mean, right now. Number two, we can certainly work on hopefully getting additional housing for veterans who may not have, you know, acute problems from IEDs.

If we do that and we work together, I think then that we can segue this out in a way that is, let's say, the new and refreshing speed without this potential injunctive relief coming in on top of you where the Court just imagined 4,000. What do you do with that?

If we work together, I think we can accomplish this. I'm afraid of the adversarial process, and I'm telling you that.

A couple more random thoughts, and then I'm done.

Does he have the attention of this administration? How do I pronounce his name? McDonough? Does he have the attention of this administration? Can he get HUD together in the same

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1 room with EPA and stop this nonsense? I'm just throwing that out to you. It's going to 3 take some leadership. If it doesn't come from the head of 4 the VA, then it's going to have to come from Congress or That means that this Court is involved in this 5 somebody. 10:24AM litigation process that may or may not drive that process. 6 7 So he's invited but not required. But if he can 8 get here for 53 units, he ought to get here for 4,000. And I want it at his level. My attorneys in past lawsuits are 9 10:25AM 10 mouthpieces, and I don't mean that facetiously. You do the 11 bidding of whoever is giving you directions. You're not 12 problem solvers. So this has to take place with somebody at 13 this level, you know, with your guidance and wisdom being 14 imparted. And since you're now involved, period --15 10:25AM 16 MR. SMITH: Yes, I am. 17 THE COURT: Maybe the chairman of the board? 18 MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. The president of 19 HACLA is who I'm working with and representing. 2.0 THE COURT: And where do you get your funding? 10:25AM 21 MR. SMITH: Through HUD. 2.2 THE COURT: And how is the board involved? 23 MR. SMITH: Well, the funding comes through HUD. 2.4 THE COURT: Good, yeah. And the chairman of the board? 25 10:25AM

	1	MR. SMITH: Uh-huh.
	2	THE COURT: Always requested, never ordered. All
	3	right.
	4	Now, do you have any questions of me? I haven't
10:25AM	5	given you direction. I've given you absolute transparent
	6	thoughts. But unless you move with injunctive relief or
	7	settlement, I'm now moving very quickly with trial. So
	8	expect six months, about. When you come back to me on
	9	January 4th, scheduling conference and, say, trial is going
10:26AM	10	six months? June, July at the latest. Okay?
	11	MR. ROSENBAUM: We're good with that, Your Honor.
	12	THE COURT: Okay. Any questions of me?
	13	MR. SILBERFELD: Your Honor, Roman Silberfeld. In
	14	the spirit of better together, I was going to offer to
10:26AM	15	prepare a joint report after we have a chance to meet and
	16	confer, and file that on the 28th. Is that that's a week
	17	before
	18	THE COURT: Listen, I'm taking no time off. I'm
	19	going to be around, you know. So absolutely, but January 4th
10:26AM	20	is the
	21	MR. SILBERFELD: Right. And we'll be happy to meet
	22	with counsel and
	23	THE COURT: Absolutely.
	24	MR. SILBERFELD: right after this.
10:26AM	25	THE COURT: Let's see if we can move together.

	1	On behalf of the amicus?
	2	MR. PERKOWSKI: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
	3	THE COURT: Would you thank all of the folks. I
	4	actually took the liberty of naming the amicus briefing. It
10:26AM	5	was just excellent. Thank them.
	6	MR. PERKOWSKI: We appreciate that.
	7	Schwartz is here in the audience.
	8	THE COURT: ACLU? You okay?
	9	MS. DANFORTH-SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:26AM	10	THE COURT: Counsel?
	11	MR. ROSENBAUM: Nothing further, Your Honor.
	12	THE COURT: Okay. Then back to HACLA.
	13	MR. SMITH: I was just going to say, Your Honor, on
	14	that January 4th date, I believe you proposed 9:00 a.m. Is
10:27AM	15	there any way we can push that back an hour or two? I looked
	16	at my calendar, and I have an appearance that morning that I
	17	can call in and get over here with.
	18	THE COURT: We can make it 10:00 o'clock. Change
	19	it to 10, okay?
10:27AM	20	So 10:00 o'clock, January 4th.
	21	MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.
	22	THE COURT: We can accommodate that.
	23	Counsel?
	24	MR. ROSENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. Brad
10:27AM	25	Rosenberg from DOJ. Just two housekeeping matters. I was

1 going to ask about a status report. Is it now due on the 28th, or do we have a little bit more flexibility regarding that? 3 THE COURT: If you two -- listen, I'm working all 4 the time. You just tell me when you have that status report 5 10:27AM to me, and I don't care if it's that weekend. 6 7 MR. ROSENBERG: Okay. We can -- we agree it makes 8 sense to file a status report. It may not be on the 28th. 9 THE COURT: Why don't I put it for the 28th now. 10:27AM 10 You two get together and say another date. I just need a 11 couple days to read it. Fair enough? 12 I want to humbly thank you --13 MR. ROSENBERG: One more housekeeping matter. 14 Apologies. One of the deadlines that's triggered by a denial 15 of a motion to dismiss is the answer to a complaint. 10:28AM 16 complaint is not insignificant in its length. 17 We are actually already working on that answer and are prepared to appear on January 4th and to serve -- and to 18 19 file a status report. 2.0 THE COURT: Okay. 10:28AM 21 MR. ROSENBERG: Could we at least stay the deadline 2.2 for the defendants to answer the complaint and include that 23 as part of our schedule in the status report? THE COURT: Yes, as long as that doesn't affect my 2.4 kindly thought about you going to trial sometime in June or 25 10:28AM

1 July. In other words, as long as it doesn't delay that, I don't care if the answer is delayed a week or so or whatever 3 you need. But I'm pretty adamant about this case now moving 4 rapidly. It's been through Judge Otero, Judge Walter, this 5 Court, et cetera. This case is going to move either by 10:28AM settlement, by injunctive relief, or by litigation. 6 7 MR. ROSENBERG: To be clear, Your Honor, what we 8 would -- suspending at least temporarily the answer deadline 9 would allow us to put that on a separate track and move 10:29AM 10 forward expeditiously, as the Court anticipates. 11 THE COURT: As long as you know that when you come back on January 4th, I'm setting trial dates, and you know 12 13 it's going to be June or July. So if your answer got delayed 14 a couple weeks, I don't care. 15 MR. ROSENBERG: Okav. 10:29AM 16 THE COURT: But if you come back to me and say, 17 Judge, we filed an answer two or three weeks later and now we 18 want two or three weeks or a month, no. No. 19 Counsel? 2.0 MR. SILBERFELD: Your Honor, Roman Silberfeld. 10:29AM We 21 don't have any objection to extra time on the answer --2.2 THE COURT: You can work that out. Just tell me. 23 MR. SILBERFELD: -- provided we're allowed to begin 2.4 discovery as well. THE COURT: Oh, absolutely. This case is now in a 25 10:29AM

discoverable phase. Let's move. Let's get going. And that will put pressure on all of us to either come up with a resolution, come up with injunctive relief, or come up with litigation in this matter. I would just encourage us in the long run, I think working together we can achieve a lot more than the litigation process can.

At least I heard you when you first came in say something to me that really struck, and that is: Judge, we had a settlement. If we would have had timelines, they might have been a little bit off, but we could have worked together. We just needed a consent decree or some kind of enforcement or accountability, and we could have worked together on that. Maybe we could have applied pressure to EPA at the time. Okay?

Counsel, you may have the right numbers; you may not. I just don't know yet. But we've gone up now threefold, and we've gone up 600 just since the complaint has been filed. We're the homeless veteran capital of the world right now. So I don't want to hear excuses about we can't afford it. It's the opposite. We can't afford what's happening right now, folks. That's what we can't afford.

So I would like to take a look at this VASH-HUD. It just don't see how our veterans have any benefit coming from being punished because they have a disability compensation for their combat experience.

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Lastly, I'll toss out to you this. Your veterans today are different. They're different in this regard.

World War II, some of these wounds would have killed them.

In Korea the Medivac got better. The statistics went up, but the maiming of our soldiers and marines, sailors, and Air Force went up.

We've gone from 8 million, 10 million men and women coming back from World War II to an all-professional army.

Going to an all-professional army, it's allowed the United States to avoid a draft.

Now, I might have different thoughts about that in terms of universal service, but it's allowed that luxury.

Our veterans have now changed because these are all volunteer people who have literally signed a blank check and say I'm going to volunteer to defend this country.

That's the way we're filling the Marine Corps quotas and the Army quotas. We're not in a draft. I ask you this, and I don't know: Do we owe a greater duty or not? By avoiding the draft, does that change the contractual relationship in terms of a fiduciary duty? Ask yourself that question.

Next, Vietnam comes along. Unless you move, you're going to lose a whole generation of Vietnam veterans. If we stall this out, there's a whole generation of people in their 70's and 80's who will just pass away without this issue

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	1	being decided. Now along comes Iraq and Afghanistan with
	2	IEDs. Our survival rate is much higher, but our
	3	dismemberment, the limbs, the traumatic injury from these
	4	bomb blasts, are causing a greater need of service in a sense
10:32AM	5	because the World War II veterans died of this kind of
	6	contact. Now your Medivac services are so good that you've
	7	got people living but with severe physical disabilities and
	8	from these IEDs. It's changing, and we've got to change with
	9	it. Okay?
10:32AM	10	So I wish you the best. I hope we can resolve it.
	11	If not, I'm adamant about the litigation, okay? All of you
	12	have a good day. We're in recess.
	13	MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.
	14	(Proceedings concluded at 10:32 a.m.)
	15	CERTIFICATE
	16	I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT
	17	TRANSCRIPT OF THE STENOGRAPHICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS IN
	18	THE ABOVE MATTER.
	19	FEES CHARGED FOR THIS TRANSCRIPT, LESS ANY CIRCUIT FEE
	20	REDUCTION AND/OR DEPOSIT, ARE IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE
	21	REGULATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.
	22	
	23	<u>/s/ Miriam V. Baird</u> <u>12/15/2023</u>
	24	MIRIAM V. BAIRD OFFICIAL REPORTER
	25	OFFICIAL REFORTER